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An apex court's body of cases has an internal texture, continually augmented
by recent citations to earlier, topically related cases. How can we best describe that
texture? The citation network shows a path. Specifically, what past Supreme Court
cases do more recent Supreme Court cases tend to cite together, as if a topical pair?
Using a web of those oft-cited pairs, what noun phrases appear in a given cluster of
cases more often, relative to the rate at which those phrases appear in writings
generally? To answer these questions is to map, in detail, a body of decisional law.
Using common network-analysis and corpus-linguistics tools, one can derive from a
group of cases the key empirical facets of the legal doctrine embodied in that cluster
of cases-a semantic self-portrait that the cases paint with their own words and
citations. This Article provides a pair of case studies for revealing the latent semantic
building blocks of legal doctrine. First, using a new citation dataset, I analyze the co-
citation network of a sharply defined group of Supreme Court cases (in this instance,
cases on the Warsaw Convention, a treaty that limits liability for loss or injury in
international air travel, and other cases related thereto). Second, building on a citation
dataset from prior work, I analyze the co-citation network of all the Supreme Court's
intellectual property cases from 1947 to 2018, inclusive. With these empirical
studies, I show that co-citation analysis complements both traditional legal
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analysis-by establishing data about legal doctrine, from the bottom up, using large
case networks-and the attitudinal-model studies from political science-by
focusing on the substance of legal doctrine, rather than on judges' votes in split cases
placed on a right-left continuum.
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Rather than being little more than the characteristic form of legal jargon, the law's
practice of using and announcing its authorities-its citation practice-is part and
parcel of law's character.
-Frederick Schauer
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial opinions in common-law practice announce outcomes, describe key
facts, and link facts to outcomes with reasoned discussion of authoritative texts (e.g.,
statutes), regulatory purposes, and judicial precedents. "Reasoned justifications,
based on relevant factors, are the bread and butter ofjudicial decision making."2 And,
at least in the case of mature doctrines, precedents are key: "Rare is the opinion that
does not justify its outcome in terms of prior precedents."3
As bodies of decisional law grow, the need for case synthesis intensifies.
Taking cases two or three at a time is no longer sufficient. One must discern doctrine
1Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935 (2008); see also FREDERICK
SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 84 (2009) ("The
boundaries of law are setby the boundaries of legal authority, and law speaks as law through its sources.");
Fred R. Shapiro, Origins ofBibliometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation Analysis: The Neglected Legal
Literature, 43 J. AM. SOC'Y INFO. SCI. 337, 337 (1992) (observing that "whereas, in science, publications
and their interconnections are by-products of the research enterprise, in law, publications and their
interconnections are at the very heart of the discipline").
2 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43 (2009); see also Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ONPOL. 261,
266 (2006) ("In common law systems, law is found primarily in legal opinions, not divined from the
outcomes of cases. . . .At bottom, what law imposes is a requirement of reasonedjustification, and reasons
are found in the opinion of a court . ... This requirement of justification is fundamental in common law
systems."). This description of judicial practice applies to administrative adjudication as well; giving
reasons is a key facet of fair process, helping to prevent arbitrary state action See Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness ofAuer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 316-17 (2017) (observing
that the Administrative Procedure Act's "'arbitrary and capricious' standard ... serves to promote
'procedural fairness' by requiring agencies to give good reasons for their procedural choices-and, of
course, for their interpretations." (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015)).
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin 's Chain Novel Theory: Studying
the Path ofPrecedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1166 (2005) (footnotes omitted); see also MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 50 (1988) ("Reasoning from precedent is perhaps the
most characteristic mode of reasoning in the common law."); FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 2, at 63 ("If
you open a random page of the U.S. Reports and read a constitutional decision, you will be struck by how
much of the space is devoted to discussing the Court's previous rulings."); Anthony Niblett & Albert H.
Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1796 (2016) ("Adherence to precedent, or
stare decisis, provides the foundation of the common law."). This is just as true of statutory as it is of
common-law cases. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW 139-51 (2016).
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from larger aggregations of cases. Our traditional case-synthetic texts for organizing
and elaborating legal doctrine-digests and headnotes, treatises, and restatements of
the law-are well known to all American lawyers, from still-green ILs to weathered
lawyers and judges. Each of these synthetic forms has a different history, and each
has garnered specific critiques.5 What unites them all, as they discuss a given case,
is that they reflect their authors' interpretive judgments about what a case holds-in
addition to whatever else it says-and how broad or narrow its holding may be.6
Interpretive approaches vary, of course. "Different readers may come away from the
same opinion with quite different versions of its meaning."'
The common-law case-synthesis process ha not changed materially in the last
several decades, nor is it likely to do so in the years ahead. The primary inputs are
case texts and synthesist's judgments. There are, however, new ways to aggregate
and analyze case text to establish another semantic layer between multiple cases and
the skilled synthesist's interpretive judgments about the contours of legal doctrine.
This new semantic layer results from applying the tools of citation-network analysis
and corpus linguistics to a body of judicial opinions, the tools of citation-network
analysis and corpus linguistics. The Article in hand describes and applies these tools
to two illustrative networks of United States Supreme Court case citations. One
' On digests and treatises, see generally EDWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
PUBLISHING 121-27, 141-56 (1990); and Patti Ogden, "Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law ": A
Story ofLegal Citation Indexes, 85 LAW LIB. J. 1 (1993). On the American Law Institute's restatement
projects, see generally Nathan M. Crystal, Codification and the Rise ofthe Restatement Movement, 54
WASH. L. REV. 239 (1979); and G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of
Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1997).
5 See generally Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40
IND. L. REv. 205 (2007) (canvassing critiques of the ALI restatements); Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of
the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 581 (2004) (critiquing undue reliance on a dominant treatise).
Computer databases of court opinions have rendered the digests far less important, though finding aids
originating in the digests-such as West headnotes and the key number system-remain useful in the
databases. Sabrina Sondhi, Should We Care Ifthe Case Digest Disappears? A Retrospective Analysis and
the Future ofLegal Research Instruction, 27 LEG. REF. SRvS. Q. 263, 266, 277 (2008).
6
See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 2 (2016) ("When lawyers and judges
analyze a precedent, they're usually trying to determine just what its holding is. They're also trying to
gauge how broadly or narrowly the holding sweeps. . . ."). There is also, it must be said, disagreement
over the dividing line between holding and dicta. Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted). The "may" matters here. As Hart observed of English precedent-and he
could just as well have been speaking of United States precedent-although "there is no single method of
determining the rule for which a given authoritative precedent is an authority," it is also true that "in the
vast majority of decided cases there is very little doubt. The head-note is usually correct enough." H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134 (3d ed. 2012).
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network centers on disputes about the Warsaw Convention,8 a treaty that "govern[ed]
air carrier liability for injuries to passengers and damages to baggage and cargo
during international carriage." The Supreme Court's eight Warsaw Convention
caseso make for a readily identifiable starting point with a sharply defined outer
boundary. The other network-building on data from prior work-contains the
Supreme Court's citations to its earlier cases, from all the Court's intellectual
property law decisions from 1947 to 2018.11 The latter network's membership is
more open to debate, but usefully involves many more source cases decided over a
longer span of time.
The co-citation and keyword analysis techniques I use in this work, though
novel in law, are well established in their home fields of bibliometrics1 2 and corpus
linguistics.13 Two papers, twenty-five years ago, urged the benefits of analyzing the
co-citation networks within case law."1 But the legal literature, to date, lacks any co-
"Warsaw Convention" is the common name for the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000. See generally Andreas F.
Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497
(1967) (describing the early years of United States' adherence to the treaty).
9 Philip Weissman, The Warsaw and Montreal Conventions: Ending the Complete Preemption Debate,
30 AIR & SPACE L., no. 3, 2017, at 1. The Warsaw Convention was replaced, in 2003 in the United States,
by the Montreal Convention, id., more formally the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,038 (2000).
10 See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
"See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Charting Supreme Court Patent Law, Near and Far, 17 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 377 (20 18).
1
2 
See generally ROBERTO TODESCHINI & ALBERTOBACCINI, HANDBOOK OF BIBLIOMETRIC INDICATORS:
QUANTITATIVE TOOLS FOR STUDYING AND EVALUATING RESEARCH 39-42 (2016) (describing citation
and co-citation network analysis).
" See generally Jane Evison, What Are the Basics of Analyzing a Corpus?, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 122, 127-28 (Anne O'Keefe & Michael McCarthy eds., 2010)
(describing keyword analysis).
" Ogden, supra note 4, at 47 (footnotes omitted) ("Co-citation analysis ... measures the strength of the
relationship between two cases based on how many times later cases cited both of them together. . .. Co-
citation patterns among groups of citations have been used in scientific literature to model the intellectual
structure of specific discipline areas. Shifts in co-citation patterns among a group of legal cases could,
over a period ofyears, help scholars detect the emergence, or chart the development, of certain specialized
areas of the law.. . . These techniques of combining citations and measuring the strength of relationship
between cases offer hope for new dimensions in information retrieval, and there is no reason this
breakthrough should not apply to law."); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law
Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1457 (1991) (footnotes omitted) ("Co-citation analysis offers intriguing
possibilities for mapping legal scholarship or case law. .. . The historical development of areas of legal
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citation analysis of a network of judicial opinions' citations to precedent." This gap
is part of a larger deficiency in existing legal research: "Citation to precedent in
judicial opinions is a seriously understudied phenomenon."16 Whatever accounts for
the delay in deploying network-analysis tools to explore new ways to synthesize
legal doctrine, the case studies I report here show that the network analysis of case-
law co-citations truly "is a versatile, rigorous, practical-and, increasingly, an
inexpensive-tool of empirical research."17
The plan of this Article is straightforward. After reviewing the development of
co-citation network analysis within bibliometrics, I describe the methods used for
collecting and analyzing the citation networks examined here. Next, I report the
results, showing that network analysis reveals facets of doctrine that traditional legal
analysis cannot. Others, I hope, will take up the methods proved here.
II. CO-CITATION NETWORK ANALYSIS
In a critically important 2007 study, The Web ofLaw, Professor Thomas Smith
demonstrates that "[t]he legal citation network"-which he "call[s] the 'Web of
Law'-has an "overall topology, or mathematical structure ... [that] closely
thought could be charted by means of network diagrams showing citation connections between more
recent and older writings, or time series of co-citation maps.").
1 There is one study of co-citations to "books, book chapters, monographs, journal articles and published
proceedings" that appeared in the "2001 and 2002 issues of scholarly journals that routinely publish
research articles in media law." Yorgo Pasadeos et al., Influences on the Media Law Literature: A
Divergence of Mass Communication Scholars and Legal Scholars?, 11 COMm. L. & POL'Y 179, 190-91
(2006). "Citations to court cases," among other cited materials, "were excluded." Id. at 191. There is also
one study of co-citations to Internal Revenue Code sections in United States Tax Court decisions from
1990 to 2008. Michael J. Bommarito et al., An Empirical Survey of the Population of U.S. Tax Court
Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAx REv. 523, 540-44 (2011). Neither study, however, examines a body of
judicial opinions to determine which precedents tend to be cited together in subsequent opinions, and at
what rate. For a review of the empirical literature on judicial citations to precedent and the network
analysis thereof, see generally Joseph Scott Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent
Supreme Court IP Decisions? A Case Study, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH., no. 2, 2017, at 1, 5-15.
16 David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal
Nature ofLegal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 545, 545 (2000). "Studied" in this context means examined
both systematically and quantitatively. See generally id.
17 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
381, 402 (2000) (making this surmise of citation analysis more broadly). Quantitative study of large case-
law citation networks is still quite new. Indeed, "until recently, large-scale analyses of citation practices
were impractical; data were difficulty to acquire, analyses methods were rudimentary, and computational
power was insufficient." Ryan Whalen et al., Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of
Information, 9 ELON L. REV. 115, 120 (2017). Happily, "[i]n the last decade, all three of the barriers to
large-scale empirical citation analysis have been greatly reduced." Id.
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resembles that of the World Wide Web," 8 in which "a few nodes have many links,
while most nodes have only a few."19 Using Shepard's citation-index data to
aggregate case-specific inward and outward citations20 and examine large cohorts
(e.g., all state cases, or all federal cases),2 1 Smith finds that "[i]n each jurisdiction
there are relatively very few cases that are cited very frequently, and a large majority
of rarely or never cited cases."22 With respect to the Supreme Court, in particular,
Smith shows that "[c]ases receiving one hundred citing references or more comprise
only 9.7% of all cited cases," whereas "[a]lmost 68% of cited opinions are cited ten
or fewer times."23 In effect, "[i]f cases that receive more citing references are thought
of as more authoritative, we can see that authority is concentrated in a relatively few
opinions, and that most opinions have relatively little authority. "24
Smith also surmises that, because other networks with this Web-like citation
topology "tend to be organized in clusters," the network of judicial opinions may
cluster as well-in "clusters of cases which are relatively tightly linked within
themselves, but more sparsely linked to each other," and which "probably correlate
highly with underlying legal semantics."25 In other words, "cases in the same legal
cluster are likely to be related to each other in terms of meaning and subject matter. "26
One can see why this would be so, considered from the perspective of authoring
judges across a run of cases:
" Thomas A. Smith, The Web ofLaw, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 310-11 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
'9 Id. at 318; see also id. at 321 fig.4 (footnotes omitted). The pattern should be intuitively familiar to legal
scholars: "Forty-three percent of articles are not cited at all, and about 79% get ten or fewer citations." Id.
at 336; see also id. at 335 fig.12 (cross-plotting law review citation count against item count).
20 Id. at 312 nn.12, 324-25 (footnotes omitted).
21 Id. at 325-28.
22 Id. at 314 (footnotes omitted).
23 Id. at 330-31 (footnotes omitted). For the cross-plot of citation count by number of cases with that
count, see id. at 329 fig.8.
24 Id. at 330; see also id. at 339 (footnotes omitted) ("A relatively few important decisions exercise the
majority of legal influence and authority, and determine the direction of law, just as a few important
scientific papers determine the direction and progress of physics (and probably other sciences as well).");
SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 80 ("Far more commonly ... the status of an authority as an authority is the
product of an informal and evolving process by which some sources become progressively more
authoritative as they are increasingly used and accepted.").
25 Smith, supra note 18, at 345.
26 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Judges cite the cases that they think are the most relevant to the case they are
deciding. When two judges deciding different cases cite some of the same
authorities, it is also a signal that those cases are relevant to each other. In this
way, the millions of decisions regarding what to cite organize the Web of Law
into what network scientists call clusters or communities. In other real networks,
these clusters form not just structures in link topology, but structures in semantic
topology as well.2 7
Smith's topical-clustering hypothesis foregrounds the promising prospects from
identifying and semantically characterizing those clusters: "If common law systems
organize themselves into [citation-driven] clusters in this way, then they would have
an organic structure that would be discoverable through network analysis."2 8 The
tools of network analysis are now, a decade on, readily available for use with large
networks of case-law citations.2 9 Moreover, the most fruitful bibliometric
approach-co-citation analysis-is the very one that Smith's conjectures commend:
"different cases cit[ing] some of the same authorities ... [is] a signal that those cases
are relevant to each other."30
A co-citation network is simply "a network where the vertices represent papers
and the edges represent co-citation of pairs of papers," and co-citation analysis
"studies the relationship among co-cited papers."31 The edge connecting a pair of
nodes in such a network can vary in weight, representing the number of times that
that pair of items has been cited together in each of the other items in the group under
study.32 The edge weight, or "co-citation strength," is a measure of how similar the
authors of the citing papers judged the cited items to be, i.e., "the degree of
relationship or association between papers as perceived by ... citing authors."33 By
aggregating these authors' judgments, one can "measure the intellectual relationship
" Id. at 341.
28 Id. at 315; see also id. at 345 (suggesting that "clustering analysis may reveal a mode of [semantic]
organization that is naturalistic, that is, an organization that is found in the legal system, rather than
imposed upon it").
29 See Miller, supra note 15, at 10-15, 29-35.
31 Id. at 341.
31 TODESCHINI & BACCINI, supra note 12, at 40, 77.
32 See id. at 40-4 1; Henry Small, Co-citation in the Scientific Literature: A New Measure of the
Relationship Between Two Documents, 24 J. AM. SOCY FOR INFO. SCI. 265, 265 (1973).
3 TODESCHINI & BACCINI, supra note 12, at 41 (citing generally Small, supra note 32).
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among papers."34 For example, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court in Riley
v. California,35 the 2014 cellphone search case, cites both Boyd v. United States36
and Kentucky v. King.7 A later court thus linked Boyd and King. The Chief Justice's
more recent opinion for the Court in Carpenter v. United States,38 the 2018 cell tower
search case, also cites both Boyd and King. The two cases have been linked once
again. And so on.
To illustrate the phenomenon more generally, consider a group of eight judicial
opinions. The first two in time, 01 and 02, do not cite any other cases. The
subsequent opinions, 03 to 08, cite 01 or 02. Specifically, cases 03 to 06 cite 01,
and cases 04 to 08 cite 02. Cases 04 to 06 thus co-cite cases 01 and 02. Treating
cases 03 to 08 as citation sources and cases 01 and 02 as citation targets, we list











We can also map the network of citations to visualize the nodes and edges listed
in the table. Figure 2 presents an example map of the simple citation network. All
the edges are the same weight, because they reflect a single, directed citation out
from a source node and into a target node. Importantly, we can further map the co-
citation network, shown in Figure 3.39 In our example, because only two of the nodes
(01 and 02) are co-cited by subsequent cases, only those nodes appear in the map.
The edge between them has a weight indicating the pair's co-citation strength in the
simple network; the "3" on the edge states that co-citation strength.
3 Id. at 77.
3 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382, 403 (2014).
36 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
37 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
31 Carpentery. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214, 2222-23 (2018).
39 1 have adapted this example from one described in TODESCHINI & BACCINI, supra note 12, at 40-41.
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Figure 2: Simple citation network
S 0
Figure 3: Co-citation network
Henry Small, who helped establish and develop co-citation analysis, did so as
a way to map the relationships among papers in a scientific research field, with
special attention to the way those relationships change over time as new subfields
emerge within (and ultimately separate from) existing fields.40 As Small explains,
"[i]n measuring co-citation strength, we measure the degree of relationship or
association between papers as perceived by the population of citing authors."1 One
can also map the citation relationships graphically, in a manner that reports co-
citation strength and thus highlights key idea-clusters that help define a field.4 2 If
"frequently cited papers represent the key concepts, methods, or experiments in a
field, then co-citation patterns can be used to map out in great detail the relationships
between these key ideas."4 3 Critically, co-citation strength is dynamic, changing as a
" Small, supra note 32, at 265.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 266-67 fig.1, tbl.1.
4 Id. at 265-66 (footnotes omitted). As De Bellis puts it in her comprehensive history of bibliometric
methods, "[a]bove a certain threshold, structural affinities between the co-cited documents are likely to
emerge for the simple reason that, by agreeing on what constitutes the previous significant sources,
scientists define, to a certain extent, the intellectual boundaries of their research field." NICOLA DEBELLIS,
BIBLIOMETRICS AND CITATION ANALYSIS 158 (2009).
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literature grows: " [B]ecause of th[e] dependence on the citing authors, these patterns
can change over time, just as vocabulary co-occurrences can change as subject fields
evolve . . . . Co-citation patterns change as the interests and intellectual patterns of
the field change."4 In the years since Small pioneered the co-citation network
analysis and mapping, others have used the techniques to discern relationships
among key ideas in varied research fields (and subfields) from the physical and social
sciences.5 Given that scholarly papers push hard into novel territory, in contrast to
decisional law's preference for stable gradualism, it seems likely that the change rate
in co-citation patterns is considerably higher in a set of published research papers
than in a set of judicial cases.
Co-citation analysis frequently deals with many thousands of citations in
hundreds or thousands of research articles. For example, Kieran Healy's co-citation
network of the philosophy literature draws on more than 2,200 articles published
between 1993 and 2013 in four leading general-interest philosophy journals.46 One
" Small, supra note 32, at 265; see also id. at 266 ("Changes in the co-citation patterns, when viewed
over a period of years, may provide clues to understanding the mechanism of specialty development."),
268 ("The pattern of linkages among key papers establishes a structure or map for the specialty which
may thenbe observed to change through time. Through the study of these changing structures, co-citation
provides a tool for monitoring the development of scientific fields, and for assessing the degree of
interrelationship among specialties."). The dynamic character does hit a limit, given that the most recent
papers in a field have not themselves garnered citations (and thus co-citations) from others. See Kevin W.
Boyack & Richard Klavans, Co-Citation Analysis, Bibliographic Coupling, and Direct Citation: Which
Citation Approach Represents the Research Front Most Accurately?, 61 J. AM. SOC'Y FOR INFO. SCI. &
TECH. 2389, 2391 (2010) (observing that co-citation "cannot cluster the most recent papers that have not
yet been cited").
5 See, e.g., EUGENE GARFIELD, CITATION INDEXING-ITS THEORY AND APPLICATION IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND HUMANITIES 98-147 (1979) (providing a detailed review of the first few years of co-
citation studies, conducted by Small and others); Debra L. Casey & G. Steven McMillan, Identifying the
"Invisible Colleges" ofthe Industrial & Labor Relations Review: A Bibliometric Approach, 62 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 126 (2008); Ella Desmedt & Martin Valcke, Mapping the Learning Styles "Jungle ": An
Overview of the Literature Based on Citation Analysis, 24 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 445 (2004); Katherine
Gundolf & Matthias Filser, Management Research and Religion: A Citation Analysis, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS
177 (2013); Pasadeos et al., supra note 15; Antonio-Rafael Ramos-Rodriguez & Jose Ruiz-Navarro,
Changes in the Intellectual Structure of Strategic Management Research: A Bibliometric Study of the
Strategic Management Journal, 1980-2000, at 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 981 (2004); Kai-Yu Tang et al.,
A Co-Citation Network of Young Children's Learning with Technology, 19 EDUC. TECH. & SOC'Y 294
(2016); Malcolm Tight, Higher Education Research as Tribe, Territory and/or Community: A Co-Citation
Analysis, 55 HIGHER EDUC. 593 (2008); Howard D. White & Katherine W. McCain, Visualizing a
Discipline: An Author Co-Citation Analysis ofInformation Science, 1972-1995, at 49 J. AM. SOC'Y FOR
INFO. SCI. 327 (1998); Kieran Healy, A Co-Citation Network for Philosophy, KIERANHEALY.ORG
(June 18, 2013), https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/18/a-co-citation-network-for-philosophy/.
" Healy, supra note 45.
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might then group the application of network methods to judicial outputs together
with other large-dataset approaches to studying judicial outputs, such as the many
political-science studies of ideology as a predictor of judges' votes in a large run of
cases.4 From that perspective, co-citation analysis and political-science studies of
judicial behavior are alike in using large datasets, in contrast to the necessarily more
selective, anecdotal approaches of both traditional doctrinal scholarship" and close
narrative studies of court life" and judicial biography.0
But with respect to the output under study, co-citation studies differ from both
doctrinal exegesis and political-science attitudinal-model studies. In traditional legal
scholarship, cases matter both for how they describe doctrine and how they apply
that doctrine to case-specific facts, reaching a specific outcome. In judicial or curial
biography, cases are neither substantive doctrine nor votes to tally so much as they
are events that propel narratives. Political scientists studying judicial behavior
largely ignore cases' doctrinal discussions, although-like doctrinalists-they care
about outcomes; a wag might say that, along with judges' ideologies, votes are all
they care about." Co-citation network analysis also contrasts with doctrinal
" See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE 65-99 (2013) (reviewing this empirical literature comprehensively).
4 "Legal academics understand that the language of judicial opinions represents the law. The classical
form of legal scholarship was doctrinal nalysis, in which a researcher examined the content of a legal
opinion to evaluate whether it was effectively reasoned or to explore its implications for future cases."
Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U.L. REV. 517, 518 (2006); see
also Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in Business
Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357, 363 n.18 (2005) ("Often, doctrinal research bases its
conclusions on a set of data that is both highly selective and rather small relative to the total amount of
available data-for example, by limiting the data set to a few appellate court opinions. . . .").
49 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979).
51 See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME
COURT JOURNEY (2005); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
51 See Friedman, supra note 2, at 262 ("Yet, reflecting an almost pathological skepticism that law matters,
positive scholars of courts and judicial behavior simply fail to take law and legal institutions seriously.").
The critique has been made by judicial-behavior adepts as well:
In stark contrast to legal research, many social scientists have disregarded the
significance of doctrine entirely.. . . Since the outcomes of cases could easily
be coded on a binary scale (as conservative or liberal, affirmance or reversal,
etc.), outcomes analysis became the default tool for quantitative social
scientific studies ofjudicial decisionmaking [sic].
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scholarship but in the opposite way, ignoring case outcomes but tracking citations to
the court's prior cases, which embody legal doctrine as the judges themselves
describe it. When we organize approaches to studying apex courts' outputs by
whether they focus on legal doctrine or outcome valence, as in Figure 4, the
complementary nature of co-citation analysis is apparent.
Studying An Apex Is the vote/outcome important?
Court's Outputs Yes No
traditional co-citation
Is the Yes doctrinal analysis analysis
doctrinal content attitudinal-model
important? No studies The Brethren
Figure 4: Output-based approaches to apex courts
There is, moreover, reason to hope this is not simply the vice of filling a much-
needed gap in the literature. Lee Epstein, a leading figure in empirical studies of
judicial behavior, has approvingly noted that "studies are now moving beyond the
vote with the goal of analyzing the many other choices judges make," including
"what precedents (and other authority) to cite."5 2 Co-citation analysis may thus serve
as a bridge joining substantive legal analysis and political-science empirics.53
Consider, for example, that a core feature of political-science studies of judicial
behavior is the use of one or more ex post ideology scores for the individual judges
studied." A particularly prominent ideology score in these studies, known as the
Tiller & Cross, supra note 48, at 522-23 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 528 ("Political researchers
have too often focused on outcomes and ignored legal doctrine. Legal researchers have studied doctrine
as pure legal reasoning, without recognizing its political component.").
52 Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study ofJudicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARYL. REV. 2017, 2049-
50 (2016).
5 For a similar account of citation analysis from a European-law perspective, mutatis mutandis, see Urska
Sadl & Henrik Palmer Olsen, Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using
Citation Network and Corpus Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts, 30 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 327, 328-30 (2017).
54 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 70-77 (discussing various ex ante and ex post judicial ideology
scores). Ex post here means "based on judicial votes," i.e., shown in behavior after the studied persons
became judges. Id. at 107.
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Martin-Quinn score," is based on a judge's votes in a multi-member court's split
decisions-its "non-unanimous cases."56 In other words, the decisions that show
ideology as political scientists use the term, are the very ones that separate the justices
by favored outcome. As Martin and Quinn explain in the central paper developing
this score using Supreme Court data, "[w]e exclude unanimous cases because they
contribute no information to the likelihood" of an outcome." The Court, however,
decides many cases unanimously-about hirty percent, for example, from 1946-
2009." Traditional legal analysis does not ignore unanimous cases, for they are
equally critical to the shape and direction of legal doctrine as a discursive practice.
Co-citation analysis also takes full account of unanimous decisions, along with
divided ones, empirically examining the citation facet of that same discursive
practice.
How does co-citation analysis play this complementary role, pulling doctrinal
analysis beyond selective normative models and pulling attitudinal studies beyond
coded judge-vote tallies? Citation networks are a significant step toward a much
deeper context.5 9 Specifically, co-citation maps and the networks they depict are
semantically rich. As Small himself noted, a citation to an earlier work is not only a
" Id. at 74-75 (describing the Martin-Quinn score), 106-11 (reporting Martin-Quinn scores for all
Supreme Court Justices using voting data from the 1937 to the 2009 terms, inclusive).
56 Id. at 107. This continues the practice of the pioneer of attitudinal studies of judicial behavior, Herman
Pritchett. Id. at 65-69 (discussing Pritchett's early work). Pritchett, struck by the fact "that Supreme Court
Justices were publishing dissenting opinions at [a then-]unprecedented rate," he tallied "the number of
non-unanimous decisions in which pairs of Justices voted together" and ordered the Justices on a right-
left continuum. Id. at 67-68.
5 Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, at 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 137 a3 (2002) (emphases added).
51 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 124-26 & fig.3.1 (providing unanimity-rate data across all cases).
The likelihood of a divided vote on outcome is not the same across all doctrinal areas. "The biggest
ideological voting differences between Justices appointed by Presidents of different parties are found in
union, civil rights, and due process cases and the smallest differences in judicial power, federalism,
privacy, and federal tax cases." Id. at 113; see also id. at 133 & tbl.3.12. In a sense, then, using metrics
that take no account of votes in unanimous cases-which differ predictably by subject matter-is doubly
removed from a comprehensive account of judicial behavior.
59 Cf MATTHEW L. JOCKERS, MACROANALYSIS: DIGITAL METHODS AND LITERARY HISTORY 27 (2013)
("The result of such macroscopic investigation is contextualization on an unprecedented scale. The
underlying assumption is that by exploring the literary record writ large, we will better understand the
context in which individual texts exist and thereby better understand those individual texts.").
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pointer, not only a sign of the earlier work-though it is that.60 A citation is also a
symbol of the concept(s) that the earlier work has come to represent o experienced
participants in the field-"the cited document (or its sign) is a symbol for a
concept."61 And the act of citing the earlier work is the very means by which those
experienced participant-authors create and confer the symbol's meaning in a shared
discourse such as decisional law: "In citing a document an author is creating its
meaning, and this ... is a process of symbol making."62 A co-citation map is thus a
semantic map, as well.
One way to depict a co-citation map is to label the nodes and the cited papers
with each of the paper's citation information.63 That mapping convention is likely
quite readable for an expert in the field(s) that the co-citation network charts. For a
less expert reader, however, the semantic content of the map is less accessible.
Small's research group developed a helpful technique to make the map's semantic
content more apparent on its face, harnessing recurring words in the titles of citing
papers to describe cited papers. Specifically, Small and Griffith created a "word
profile" for each of the 1,832 items that had been cited 10 or more times in the portion
of Science Citation Index data under review (from the first quarter of 1972).64 The
6o Henry G. Small, Cited Documents as Concept Symbols, 8 Soc. STUD. SCI. 327, 329 (1978) (noting that,
at one level, "the citation as 'author, journal, volume, page and year' is a sign for the physical document
itself').
61 Id.; see also id. at 328 (stating "that a cited document is formally analogous to a subject heading in an
indexing system").
62 Id. at 328; see also White & McCain, supra note 45, at 328 ("Writers show commonalities in how they
judge the subject matter, methodology, and intellectual style of other writers; for example, they often
attach the same meanings and significance to precedent works.... Call this structure, for which writers
are jointly not singly responsible, the consensus on past literature."). Legal historian James Boyd White
has made this meaning-making function of decisional law explicit:
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, telling its
story in a particular way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the process it
connects the case with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general
concerns. It translates the experience of the parties, and the languages inwhich
they naturally speak of it, into the language of the law, which connects cases
across time and space.... The opinion thus engages in the central conversation
that is for us the law, a conversation that the opinion itself makes possible.
James Boyd White, What 's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367-68 (1995).
63 See, e.g., Henry Small & Belver C. Griffith, The Structure of Scientific Literatures I: Identifying and
Graphing Specialties, 4 SCI. STUD. 17, 29-30, fig.1 & fig.2 (1974).
6
1 d. at 20, 31.
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word profile for a cited item comprised the four most frequently used words (other
than common words such as "the") in the titles of the items citing it.6 A resulting
co-citation map can be redrawn to label nodes with their associated word profiles.66
"Faddeev L, ZH Eksp Teor, 1960," for example, becomes "Collisions, Particles,
Scattering, Approximation."6 7
In a body of interconnected judicial decisions, no less than in a body of
scholarly research literature, citations are both signs and symbols. Over time, a case
name can come to stand for a complex body of doctrine: arresting officers give
suspects Miranda warnings;68 a prosecutor's failure to provide the defendant
exculpatory evidence is a Brady violation;69 a criminal defendant's contention that
potential jurors were peremptorily struck from the venire on racial grounds is a
Batson challenge;70 a civil suit alleging a federal official's violation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights is a Bivens action;71 a pretrial proceeding to test the admissibility
of a party's proffered expert testimony is a Daubert hearing;72 a federal court that
refrains from enjoining a parallel, pending state criminal case is engaged in Younger
abstention;73 and so on. These case-based symbols run through and knit together the
6
1 Id. at 31 & n.23.
66 Id. at 32-33, fig.3 & fig.4.
67 Compare id. at 29 fig.1, with id. at 32 fig.3.
61 See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2170 (2016) ("The state trooper arrested
Birchfield for driving while impaired, gave the usual Miranda warnings, again advised him of his
obligation under North Dakota law. . . ."). The term references Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69 See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2016) ("The PCRA court determined that
the trial prosecutor-Chief Justice Castille's former subordinate in the district attorney's office-had
engaged in multiple, intentional Brady violations during Williams's prosecution"). The term relies on
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
71 See, e.g., Fosterv. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (2016) ("The State exercised nine of its ten allotted
peremptory strikes, removing all four of the remaining black prospective jurors. Foster immediately
lodged a Batson challenge."). The term references Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
71 See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) ("The question is whether we can imply the
existence of an Eighth Amendment-based damages action (a Bivens action) against employees of a
privately operated federal prison."). The term references Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Tingle, 880 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Although the court never held a
Daubert hearing, a hearing is unnecessary 'where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken
for granted."') (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). The term references
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
n See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) ("This Court has extended
Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions or that
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cases that use them. "Citation is not just a pathway to precedent-it is the language
the law uses to embody its precedential character."4 Even so, not every case or body
of cases generates a short semantic tag that lawyers can conveniently deploy. And
case names, of course, come from the parties' names-they are not composed for the
purpose of describing a case's content, in contrast to (most) law-journal articles'
titles. As a result, if one wants to develop a semantic tag, or tag set, for a given node
or cluster of cases in a case-law co-citation network, one must develop an alternative
to the citing-articles'-titles method from Small and Griffiths. The germ of that
alternative, however, is from Small and Griffiths-namely, frequently used words.
Judicial opinions are texts built of words, written by and for people to
communicate. A set of opinions is, in short, a corpus, "a collection of texts."" We
can study a corpus of judicial opinions using the methods and tools of corpus
linguistics, "the aim [of which is] the analysis and description of language use, as
realised in text(s)."76 Today, the focus of corpus linguistics is machine-readable text,
analyzing corpora that are "usually of a size which defies analysis by hand and eye
alone within any reasonable timeframe."" A corpus is valuable in that, at least as to
some questions, "it is a more reliable guide to language use than native speaker
intuition."" Intuition is definitely "a poor guide" in estimating word frequency.7 9
One particular form of frequency analysis common to corpus linguistics is keyword
analysis, which compares two corpora to determine which words "are significantly
implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.") (internal citations
omitted). The term references Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
7 Schauer, supra note 1, at 1955 n.75; see also ALEXA Z. CHEW & KATIE R.G. PRYAL, THE COMPLETE
LEGAL WRITER 12 (2016) ("Because lawyers use legal citations to support their claims, legal citations
are an integral part of every legal text that you read. And they are an integral part of legal discourse.").
7 Elena Tognini Bonelli, Theoretical Overview of the Evolution of Corpus Linguistics, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 14, 18 (Anne O'Keefe & Michael McCarthy eds.,
2010).
76 Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
7 TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-2
(2012). "Linguists have always used the term corpus to describe a collection of naturally occurring
examples of language.... More recently, the word has been reserved for collections of texts (or parts of
texts) that are stored and accessed electronically." SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS
2 (2002). The goal is not to read the texts in the corpus (as one would in an archive), but rather to study
the content "nonlinearly, and both quantitatively and qualitatively." Id.
78 HUNSTON, supra note 77, at 20.
79 Id. at 20.
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more frequent in one corpus than another."0 Specifically, keywords "are those words
which are identified by statistical comparison of a 'target' corpus with a larger
corpus, which is referred to as the 'reference' or 'benchmark' corpus."" Having
processed a group of texts into a corpus using an automated annotation program,
thereby labelling each token8 2 in the corpus with part-of-speech and lemma tags,8 3
one can compare the target to a reference to determine which terms in the target occur
unusually more frequently there (relative to the reference) and list terms in the target
in descending order of keyness, i.e., unusualness.
Take, for example, the Supreme Court's recent cases adjudicating civil-rights
challenges to state-sanctioned legal restrictions imposed on lesbian and gay people,
starting with Romer v. Evans." One can create a corpus containing the texts of all
the opinions in this line of cases-a line that includes, in addition to Romer,
Lawrence v. Texas,8 6 United States v. Windsor," Obergefell v. Hodges,"8 and Pavan
v. Smith.89 Using corpus linguistics software such as Sketch Engine, a well-
" Id. at 68. Hunston reports that "[m]any researchers find 'keywords' a useful starting point in
investigating a specialized corpus." Id.
" See Evison, supra note 13, at 127; see id. at 127-28 (providing example keyword analyses). The term
"key-word" is also used, in contrast o my use here, to refer to subject-matter tags that an author, or similar
authority (e.g., an authoring judge), places on the document. For example, when posting a draft paper to
the Social Science Research Network, the author is asked to provide his or her own keywords as finding
aids for the paper. See SSRN, SSRN Support Page: Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.ssrn.com/
en/index.cfm/ssrn-faq/ (discussing keywords). These keywords are assigned top down, rather than
emerging bottom-up from usage.
82 A token is "[a]ny single, particular instance of an individual word in a text or corpus." MCENERY &
HARDIE, supra note 77, at 252.
83 Id. at 245 (defining "lemma" as "[a] group of wordforms that are related by being inflectional forms of
the same base word," and "lemmatisation" as "[a] form of corpus annotation where every token in the
corpus is labelled to indicate its lemma").
8 See Evison, supra note 13, at 127-28 (providing examples); Mike Scott, What Can Corpus Software
Do?, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 136, 149-50 (Anne O'Keefe & Michael
McCarthy eds., 2010) (same).
85 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
86 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
8 Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
89 Pavanv. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
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established9 0 web-based suite of tools,91 one can generate a list of the top ten words
and phrases (in descending keyness-score order) that most distinguish these cases
from a general English-language reference corpus.92 The output of that process as it
appears on Sketch Engine, along with the list of parameters used to generate it, is in
Figure 5. Note that, among the single-word list on the left, two of the top ten terms-
ante and supp-come from citation conventions. The Court uses "ante" from within
an opinion in a case to refer to a prior opinion in the same case,93 and "supp" is a
standard part of a citation to a district court opinion in the Federal Supplement
reporter. Other terms-homosexual, DOM4 (an acronym for the Defense of
Marriage Act, struck down in Windsor), sodomy, marriage, liberty, and bowers
(from Bowers v. Hardwick9 4)-Comport with what lawyers familiar with the cases
would expect o see on such a keyword list. Similarly, the noun phrases95 in the multi-
word list on the right are exactly the phrases lawyers would expect to see stand out
in these opinions: same-sex marriage, due process, equal protection, etc. Indeed, the
multi-word phrases may be a better guide than the single-word terms to determine
what unifies these cases.
90 See MCENERY & HARDIE, supra note 77, at 45 (describing Sketch Engine).
91 See WhatisSketch Engine?, SKETCH ENGINE, https://www.sketchengine.eu/(lastvisited July 29, 2019).
92 In all the keyword analyses I performed for this Article, I used the same reference corpus-the 2013
version of the TenTen Corpus of the English Web. See en Ten Ten-English Corpusfrom the Web, SKETCH
ENGINE, https://www.sketchengine.eu/ententen-english-corpus/ (last visited July 29, 2019).
93 In Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer, for example, I count fifteen such uses of "ante" as an intra-case
cross-reference. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Georgia's anti-
sodomy statute).
95 The keyword analysis tool in Sketch Engine focuses on noun phrases:
For example, a term in English can be composed of nouns (N), adjectives (J)
and also prepositions so the phrase should match one of these patterns N+N,
N of N, J+N, J+J+N, J+N of N, J+N of J+N etc. while preposition + article +
adjective is unlikely to be considered a term.
The Best Term Extraction, SKETCH ENGINE, https://www.sketchengine.eu/the-best-term-extraction/ (last
visited July 29, 2019).
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Figure 5: Keyword lists for the Romer line of cases
Keyword analysis is thus a valuable window into how one group of texts
compares to another, revealing terms that semantically distinguish a target group
from a reference group. The full value of the technique is plainer, however, when
one examines corpora for which one has no well-grounded set of expectations-
corpora such as those containing clusters of opinions identified, from the bottom up,
by co-citation network analysis. The methods of the study follow.
III. METHODS
The first core dataset here is, at bottom, a set of citations from within a discrete
group of United States Supreme Court decisions, pointing back to other Supreme
Court decisions. The oldest case in the network is from 1796, and the newest one is
from 2017.
To provide a starting group of Supreme Court cases with a common substantive
focus and an unmistakably clear boundary, I began with the Court's eight decisions
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about the scope and application of the Warsaw Convention.96 The cases, which span
twenty years, are-from earliest to most recent-as follows:
* Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., involving a suit to
recover lost cargo;97
* Air France v. Saks, involving a negligence claim for physical injury; 98
* Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., involving a wrongful-death claim arising
from the Soviet Union's 1983 attack on a 747 over the Sea of Japan,
killing all 269 persons aboard the KAL flight;99
* Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, involving an emotional-distress claim;00
* Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., involving a loss-of-society claim
arising from the same downed KAL flight as Chan;10 1
* Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., involving a pre-death pain and suffering
claim arising from the same downed KAL flight as Chan;10 2
* ElAllsraelAirlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, involving a psychological injury claim
for a pre-boarding search;10 3
* Olympic Airways v. Husain, involving a wrongful-death claim.104
Using these eight cases, in round #1, I made a two-column list of citing and
cited cases. The list is, in other words, a conventional edge list for mapping and
96 Though the phrase "Warsaw Convention" occurs in thirteen Supreme Court cases, there are only eight
such cases in which the phrase occurs at least two times. These eight cases, the only Supreme Court cases
resolving Warsaw Convention questions, are the core of the first network.
97 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 245-46 (1984).
98 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 394 (1985).
99 Chanv. Kor. Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 123 (1989).
100 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).
101 Zichermanv. Kor. Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1996).
102 Dooley v. Kor. Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 118 (1998).
103 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999).
10. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 648 (2004).
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analyzing a network.105 The cited list includes only Supreme Court cases cited one
or more times in the citing case-the form of precedent he Supreme Court cites most
frequently (a fact shown in multiple studies).106 Note that this citation analysis, as is
typical, does not measure varying intensity of citation;0 ' a target case cited three
times in a source case gets one row in the edge list, just as does a target case cited
once.
Importantly, in collecting all the citation data described here, I included cited
cases whether they were cited for the first time in a majority opinion, a concurrence,
or a dissent. Each citation is the authoring justice's freely chosen indication that the
cited case is an influence on what that justice views as the proper grounds for the
prudent disposition of the case. All the opinions in a case, taken together, state the
whole court's view(s). For the same reason, I included cited cases without respect to
the stated reason, if any, for the citation, or the degree to which the citing case
expressly analyzed or distinguished the cited case. The resulting network thus
reflects all the explicit tags of precedent that all the authoring justices flagged in the
cases.108 In the creation of a new semantic input for more fully discerning multiple
layers of a legal doctrine's texture, this seems only proper.
105 See M.E.J. NEWMAN, NETWORKS: AN INTRODUCTION 300 (2010) (noting that an edge list is "simply
a list of the labels of pairs of vertices that are connected by edges," and that "edge lists are often used as
a way to store network structures in computer files. . .").
10 See Miller, supra note 15, at 6-8 (reviewing studies), 19-20 (reporting results). This finding applies
generally to established apex courts with common-law roots: "Any court with a significant stock of its
own opinions shows a marked preference for citing them." William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court
Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267, 269 (2002). For a quite recent study
confirming the finding-as applied to the Supreme Court ofIndia-see Andrew Green & Albert H. Yoon,
Triaging the Law: Developing the Common Law on the Supreme Court ofIndia, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 683, 693-95 (2017) (reporting citation patterns during the 1950-2010 period).
117 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 11, at 390; see also James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of
Supreme CourtPrecedent, 30 Soc. NETWORKS 16, 18 (2008); Green& Yoon, supra note 106, at 688-89;
Miller, supra note 11, at 390.
' See Fowler & Jeon, supra note 107, at 18 ("Since legal rules are cited to provide convincing legal
justifications, the fact that the opinion writer choose[s] to cite a case in an opinion rather than leave it out
suggests that the citation, even if it is not a reliance on authority, provides applicable information about
the role of various precedents in the legal network."); William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A
Citation Analysis ofFederal Courts ofAppeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 273 (1998) ("We have
not distinguished between favorable, critical, or distinguishing citations. It is not clear that we should.
Critical citations ... are also a gauge of influence since it is easier to ignore an unimportant decision than
to spell out reasons for not following it."); Posner, supra note 17, at 386 ("[A judicial citation] can signify
an acknowledgement of priority or influence, a useful source of information, a focus of disagreement, an
acknowledgment of controlling authority, or the prestige of the cited work or its author. All of these are
forms of influence, in abroad sense, and that may be enough to justify lumping them together for purposes
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To grow the citation network from its initial seventy-eight rows, with an eye
toward examining which prior cases are repeatedly co-cited in subsequent cases, I
determined which cases, other than the original eight, were cited two or more times
by those original eight cases (to be co-cited often with another case, a case must itself
be cited often 09). This produced a list of eight additional cases. I then added to the
edge list from round #1 both (a) all Supreme Court cases, beyond the original eight,
that cite to the additional eight cases, and (b) all Supreme Court cases, beyond the
original eight, that cite to the original eight. In this round #2, and in all subsequent
rounds, I included citing cases through the Supreme Court's October 2016 Term,
ending in June 2017. After round #2, the edge list had 195 rows. Next, I identified
all citing cases that appeared two or more times in the "citing" column for which I
had not yet collected all the Supreme Court cases that cite them (for the original eight
Warsaw Convention cases, I had added all the cases citing them in round #2). This
step, round #3, added sixteen more cases in the "cited" column, for which I gathered
all the Supreme Court cases citing them. I continued this procedure through multiple
rounds, until all multiple-entry citing cases were also treated as cited cases (with the
cases citing them, in turn, listed in the "citing" column). The final edge list resulting
from this process has 326 rows.11 0
Using this edge list, I generated and mapped two networks, including centrality
measures and related values for the networks' nodes and edges. The first network, a
simple citation network, relates all the citing and cited cases in the edge list to one
another. Each node in the citation network is a case, and each edge is either a pointer
from that case to a different case it cites (an out-pointing edge) or a pointer to that
case from a different case that cites it (an in-pointing edge). The second network, a
co-citation network, relates all the co-cited cases from the edge list to one another.
Each node in the co-citation network is one-half of a pair of cases that has been co-
cited at least x times (in this study, I set x at two), and each edge has a weight equal
of citations studies concerned with measuring influence."). Of course, there are doubtless many
influences, including many influences from precedents, that an authoring justice may be perfectly well
aware of and choose, for whatever reason, not to cite explicitly in an opinion deciding the case. See, e.g.,
Ross E. Davies, A Handy "Cf " or Two for Citation Studies, 7 J.L. 1, 3 (2017) (documenting one such
example involving Justice Joseph Bradley's opinion in Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U.S. 146 (1878)). Such
gaps, I think, simply counsel modesty and circumspection, rather than distrust or despair.
109 See Small, supra note 32, at 265 ("When two papers are frequently co-cited, they are also necessarily
frequently cited individually as well.").
110 This edge list is available, as an Excel file, at this Journal's website. Prior to January 1, 2020, please
use the following URL: https://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/lawreview. After January 1, 2020,
please use the following URL: https://lawreview.pitt.edu.




to the number of times the pair it connects has been co-cited. To generate the simple
citation network, and to map and gather metrics on both networks, I used Gephi, an
open-source application for network analysis and mapping.' To generate the co-
citation network, which Gephi cannot compute on its own, I used Sci2,112 another
readily available application that both generates co-citation data and exports the
resulting network data to Gephi for mapping.
To determine what, if any, keywords differentiate groups of cases in the co-
citation network, I used Sketch Engine to provide the top twenty single-word and
multi-word keywords from corpora comprising co-cited cases. For a given cluster of
co-cited cases of interest, I first created a text file comprising all the opinions in the
cases, retrieving the text using Google Scholar's database of judicial opinions.113 In
creating the text file, I included the party names, but not the docket number, argument
and decision date, lawyers' names, or other text between the case caption and the
authoring justice's name." I then used the Sketch Engine functionality that
processes a text file into a tagged, lemmatized corpus, using Sketch Engine's default
options for doing so."' Once Sketch Engine compiles the text file into a corpus ready
"' See GEPHI, https://gephi.org/ (last visited July 29, 2019). The maps are made with a force-directed
layout algorithm, known as ForceAtlas2, that effectively treats the edges as springs holding nodes
together, and treats the nodes as charged particles that repel each other. The map rests at the point of
balance among these forces. See Mathieu Jacomy et al., ForceAtlas2, a Continuous Graph Layout
Algorithm for Handy Network Visualization Designedfor the Gephi Software, 9 PLoS ONE e98679, at 2
(June 2014) (describing this mapping approach). Gephi's maps also incorporate a community detection
algorithm, known as Modularity, and a convenient means for assigning a common color to the nodes in a
given community. "Community detection" is simply "the division of the vertices [i.e., the nodes] of a
network into groups ... according to the pattern of edges in the network. Most commonly . .. so that the
groups formed" have more connecting edges inside the group than connect them to outside groups.
NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 354. The number of groups detected is a function of the specific network's
actual structure, not a predetermined number. See id. at 378.
112 See ScI2 TOOL, https://sci2.cns.iu.edu/user/index.php (last visited July 29, 2019). For step-by-step
instructions for using Sci2 to generate a co-citation network, see Scott Weingart, Networks Demystified
7: Doing Co-Citation Analysis, THE SCOTTBOT IRREGULAR (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.scottbot.net/
HIAL/ index.html@p=39432.html.
113 GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/ (last visited July 29, 2019).
114 Consider, for example, Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). When I copied the text of the opinion
from the case's Google Scholar page, https://scholar.google.com/scholar-case?case=
10442512243664719758, I began with the three lines stating the parties' names and omitted the
information between "Saks" and "Justice O'Connor" (thirteen lines of text later).
115 The two options I had, other than choosing English as the corpus language, were for the automated
annotation programs for what Sketch Engine calls "Sketch grammar" and "Term definition." I used the
defaults for both: English 3.1 for TreeTagger pipeline v2, and English (Tree Tagger-PennTB) for terms
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.660
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 26 | VOL. 81 | 2019
for analysis, generating a list of keywords is simply a matter of choosing the
reference corpus, setting a parameter (known as "Simple Maths" in Sketch
Engine1 6 ) that varies the keyword search's preference for more or less unusual
terms, and running the analysis.
The second core dataset, which I examined using the same network software
and techniques just described, is an updated version of an edge list I first analyzed in
a previous paper."' The prior edge list included, as citing cases, all Supreme Court
intellectual property decisions from 1947 to 2017. The dataset now includes, as citing
cases, all such decisions through June 2018, the end of the Court's October 2017
term. The cited cases are simply all Supreme Court cases cited in the citing cases.
In identifying the citing cases, I defined "intellectual property" broadly. It
includes not only cases decided under the Patent, Copyright, or Lanham Acts, but
also cases that materially turn on the scope of an intellectual property right. The edge
list thus includes citing cases such as FTC v. Actavis,11 an antitrust case about
whether a type of patent-litigation-settlement agreement can violate § 1 of the
Sherman Act; and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 119 a case involving
a "human cannonball" performer's right-of-publicity claim against a broadcast
television station that had reported film footage of his act. I identified the cases using
searches (in the Westlaw SCT database) of decisions during the relevant time period,
with search terms such as "Patent Act," "Copyright Act," "Lanham Act," and
"(licens! or infring! or valid! or invalid!) /s (patent or copyright or trademark)."12 0 I
extraction 2.3, respectively. The options are provided on the "Compile corpus" page, when creating a
user-generated corpus in Sketch Engine.
116 Simple Maths, SKETCH ENGINE, https://www.sketchengine.eu/documentation/simple-maths/ (last
visited July 29, 2019).
" See Miller, supra note 11, at 389-90 (describing the then-current version of this edge list).
118 FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
19 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Inc., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The federal question in Zacchini was
whether the broadcaster's free-press right to publish news about the performance immunized the
broadcaster against the performer's right-of-publicity claim. Id. at 565-66. The Court's answer, in brief,
was "no." Zacchini's asserted right of publicity is conventionally understood to be an intellectual-property
right akin to a trademark right. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28.8 (5th ed. 2019).
120 In the Westlaw database, the "!" symbol is a truncation operator; any term with the stem to the left of
the "!" is responsive. For example, the search term "infring!" calls for infringe, infringed, infringement,
and infringing. The "/s" is a proximity operator; items that have the connected search terms in the same
sentence are responsive. WestlawNext: Searching with Boolean Terms and Connectors, THOMSON
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also relied on my familiarity with the cases from teaching them in intellectual
property courses, which I have done continuously, in one form or fashion, since
2001. The full edge list of these intellectual property cases has 1,648 rows.12 1
IV. RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A. The Simple Citation Network of the Warsaw Convention
Cases
The oldest case in the simple citation network of the Warsaw Convention cases
is Ware v. Hylton,1 2 2 which was cited once-by TWA v. Franklin Mint,12 3 the first of
the Supreme Court's Warsaw Convention cases. The most recent case in the network
is California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities,12 4 for its
citation to Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez.1 25 The network has 215 nodes and 326 edges,
with node in-degree ranging from zero to seventeen and node out-degree varying
from zero to twenty-eight.12 6 The community detection algorithm groups the network
into nine clusters of cases.
Network analysis not only allows one to graph the citing and cited relationships
in a group of cases, it also enables one to differentiate cases by their relative
importance to-their centrality in-the network using those very citation
relationships. "A citation analysis is an ideal way to tap 'case importance' . . .
define[d] as the legal relevance of a case for the network of law at the Supreme
Court."1 2 7 Because we can treat a citation "as a latent judgment by a judge regarding
the relevance of the [cited] case for helping to resolve a legal dispute," it is
"reasonable to determine how relevant a particular opinion is by considering how,"
REUTERS, https://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/WLNBoolean-Connectors-S023352_Final.pdf
(last visited July 29, 2019).
121 See supra note 110.
122 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
123 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Co., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984).
124 Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2017).
125 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1 (2014).
126 "The degree of a vertex in a graph is the number of edges connected to it." NEWMAN, supra note 105,
at 133. "The in-degree is the number of ingoing edges connected to a vertex and the out-degree is the
number of outgoing edges." Id. at 135.
127 James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance ofPrecedents
at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 325 (2007).
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in granular detail, "it is embedded in the broader network of opinions comprising the
law."
128
Which are the most important cases in the network comprising the Warsaw
Convention cases? There are, as it happens, "many possible definitions of
importance, and correspondingly many centrality measures for networks."129 One
way to quantify a node's centrality in the network is with a count of the links the
node possesses. Node degree is "[p]erhaps the simplest centrality measure in a
network," and doubtless "it can be very illuminating."130 For example, in a body of
scholarly literature, "[t]he number of citations a paper receives from other papers,
which is simply its in-degree in the citation network, gives a crude measure of
whether the paper has been influential or not and is widely used as a metric for
judging the impact of scientific research."131 And just so with a citation network that
transits a set of judicial opinions: "At the most basic level one might use the number
of inward citations, or degree centrality, to measure the importance of a given
decision."1 32
As scholars have noted, however, degree centrality is a second-best, precisely
because it treats every citing case's citation to a target case as equal in weight to
every other-even though the very citation network under examination can provide
information that negates the premise.133 To illustrate this shortcoming of degree
centrality as an importance metric, consider the simple citation network analyzed
here. It includes Medellin v. Dretke,134 a case, dismissed after oral argument at the
Supreme Court, involving a claim for relief under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. To date, the Supreme Court has cited Dretke in two other Vienna
128 Id. at 326.
129 NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 168-69; see also lain Carmichael et al., Comment, Examining the
Evolution of Legal Precedent Through Citation Network Analysis, 96 N.C. L. REV. 227, 230 (2017)
("There are many different ways to quantify the importance of a vertex in a network, called vertex
centrality metrics.").
13o NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 169; see also Carmichael et al., supra note 129, at 230 ("Two of the
simplest vertex centrality metrics are in-degree and out-degree.").
131 NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 169.
132 Fowler & Jeon, supra note 107, at 20.
13 Id. (observing that degree centrality "does not fully use information in the precedent network because
it treats all inward citations in exactly the same way").
134 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005). Notwithstanding its formal status as a dismissal of review,
the five separate opinions in the case run to 34 pages in the United States Reports. Id. at 662-95.
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Convention cases that are also in the network-Medellin v. Texas1 35 and Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon.13 6 In this network, Dretke thus has a degree centrality score of
two, with Medellin and Sanchez-Llamas each contributing one. To date, however,
the Supreme Court-as this network itself shows-has cited Medellin in twelve
subsequent cases,1 37 but cited Sanchez-Llamas in only five subsequent cases.1 38 The
degree centrality metric makes no use of that information, even though Medellin's
greater importance, compared to Sanchez-Llamas, is evident on the face of the very
network they share with Dretke.
There is need, then, of a centrality metric that does value inward citations
according to the centrality of the cases from which they originate. As before, more
than one is available.1 39 The metric that has become the norm in studies of judicial
case-citation networks,140 which is known in the network-analysis literature as "hubs
and authorities," was developed by information scientist Jon Kleinberg to organize
web pages for topical searches.' Specifically, in the Kleinberg approach,
"' Medellinv. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503 (2008).
136 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 371 (2006).
137 See Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (2017); Bank Markaziv. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310, 1337 (2016); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015); NLRB v.
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594 (2014); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014);
Bondv. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014); Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232
(2014); BG Grp. PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1218 (2014); Arizonav. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
424 (2012); Garciav. Texas, 564 U.S. 940, 941 (2011); Abbotty. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010); Noriega
v. Pastrana, 559 U.S. 917, 922 (2010).
131 See Johnsonv. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802, 1805 (2016); Henderson ex rel. Hendersonv. Shinseki, 562 U.S.
428, 434 (2011); Noriega v. Pastrana, 559 U.S. 917, 918 (2010); Medellinv. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498
(2008); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 343 (2007).
139 See NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 169-81 (describing Eigenvector, Katz, PageRank, and Hubs &
Authorities' centrality measures); see also Carmichael, supra note 129, at 237-38 (discussing the "class
of eigenvector centrality metrics," which "judge a case to be more important if it is cited by many cases
that are themselves cited by many other cases" and include "PageRank, Eigenvector centrality, and hubs
and authorities") (footnotes omitted).
14o See Bommarito, supra note 15, at 541-44; Mattias Derlen & JohanLindholm, Peek-A-Boo, It's a Case
Law System! Comparing the European Court of Justice and the United States Supreme Court from a
Network Perspective, 18 GER. L.J. 647, 656-59 (2017); Fowler & Jeon, supra note 107, at 20; Green &
Yoon, supra note 106, at 689-90; Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten, Precedent in International Courts: A
NetworkAnalysis ofCase Citations by the European Court ofHuman Rights, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 413,
427-33 (2011); Miller, supra note 11, at 389-98.
141 See Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment, 46 J. ASSOC. FOR
COMPUTING MACHINERY 604, 605 (1999) ("In particular, we focus on the use of links for analyzing the
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[a] hub is a case that cites many other decisions, helping to define which legally
relevant decisions are pertinent to a given precedent, while an authority is a case
that is widely citedby other decisions. Most cases act as both hubs and authorities,
and the degree to which cases fulfill these roles is mutually reinforcing within the
precedent network. A case that is a good hub cites many good authorities, and a
case that is a good authority is cited by many good hubs.... The resulting
[numerical] hub and authority scores allow us to identify the key precedents in the
network-precedents that are influential (authorities) and precedents that are well
founded in law (hubs). 142
Using the authority scores computed for each node in a case-citation network, then,
one can rank in order the included cases by importance.14 3
In the simple citation network analyzed here, the twenty most important cases,
ranked by their respective authority scores, include seven of the eight Warsaw
Convention cases."' The remaining Warsaw Convention case, Dooley v. Korean Air
Lines,' is tied for seventy-seventh place with three other cases, all having an
authority score of 0.002. Table 1 lists the top twenty cases, in descending authority-
score order.
Among the top five most central cases, three are Warsaw Convention cases: Air
France, Zicherman, and TWA. Two, however, are not. In Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc. v. Avagliano,14 6 the second-most central case, the Court considered the question
"whether Article VIII(1) of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty
between the United States and Japan provide [d] a defense to a Title VII employment
discrimination suit against an American subsidiary of a Japanese company.""' In
collection of pages relevant to a broad search topic, and for discovering the most 'authoritative' pages on
such topics.").
142 Fowler & Jeon, supra note 107, at 20; accord Kleinberg, supra note 141, at 611 ("Hubs and authorities
exhibit what could be called a mutually reinforcing relationship: a good hub is a page that points to many
good authorities; a good authority is a page that is pointed to by many good hubs.").
14 GEPHI, supra note 111 (computes authority and hub scores as a matter of routine).
14 See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
1 Dooley v. Kor. Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
146 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
147 Id. at 177-78. The Court answered this question "no." See id. at 189-90.




Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,"' a case with roots in the post-Civil
War abolition of slavery among the Chickasaws and Choctaws, the Court considered
"whether the Chickasaw Nation[, which had started the suit,] [wa]s entitled to
compensation for its one-fourth interest in the common lands of the two nations
allotted to the Choctaw freedmen" under an 1866 treaty and a series of implementing
statutes. 149 Thus, Sumitomo and Choctaw Nation both involve the scope of a United
States treaty, albeit one other than the Warsaw Convention.
Case Citation Authority Score
Air Franice \. Sakls*' 470 U 'S. 3,92 (1985) 050
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano 457 U.S. 176 (1982) 0.400
Chioctawm Nat ion of I idianis \. Unimted States 318 I. S. 423 (943) 0.272
Zichermianv. Koreani Air Lines Co.*' 516 U1.S. 17 (1996) 0.24
TWVA, Inw . Franlin Minit Coip. : 466 uI.s. 243 (198M4) 0.242
Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale
v. United States District Court for the 482 U.S. 522 (1987) 0.240
District of Iowa
Olymipic Airways v . IHutsain*" 540) U.S. 644 (2004) 0.2Q8
Breaid S. Greenea 52 8 U.S. 371 (1998) 0.194
The Amniable Isabella 19UL.S. (6 Wheiat.) 119
ElAl Ise l Airlines, Ltd. v. Tse * 595 U.S. 53 (1999) 0.180
Medellinv. Texas 55 U.S. 491 (2008) 0.108
Unlited statesv\. Stuart 489 U1.S. 35 1989) 0.100
Volkswn o Ak'tiengeselISChlaftv Scliln 486 U'.S. 694 (1988) 015 1
Eastern Airlines, Inc. \. Flo\&', 499 UI.S. 53 1991) 013'4
Chani \. Koreani Air Lines, Ltd. ' 490 U.'S. 122 (1989) 01 16
Medellinv Dretkec 544 U. IS. 660 (2005)) 0108
IHamdcaiiv Rumnsfeld 548 U.S. 557(2006)) 0.096
Abbotty. Abbott 560 U.S. 1 (2010) 0.091
\Maimov \. Un1ited States 373- U1.S. 49 ( 1963 ) 0.084
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 548 U.S. 331 (2006) 0.078
Table 1: Top 20 Cases, by Authority Score, in the Simple Citation Network Comprising
the Supreme Court's Warsaw Convention Cases and Related Cases (asterisk notes a
Warsaw Convention case)
In fact, all eleven of the remaining non-Warsaw Convention cases listed in
Table 1 also involve the meaning or effect of a United States treaty. Four of the
cases-Breard, Medellin v. Texas, Medellin v. Dretke, and Sanchez-Lamas-turn o
..s Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
149 Id. at 424-28 (describing the treaty and statutes). The Court answered this question "no." See id. at
433.
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the effect of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.50 Two of the cases,
Societ Nationale and Schlunk, turn on the scope of litigation-procedure treaties: the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters,"' and the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters.1 5 2 Two of the cases, Stuart and
Maximov, turn on tax treaties: the Convention between the United States and Canada
Respecting Double Taxation,15 3 and the Income Tax Convention between the United
States of America and the United Kingdom." Abbott turns on the scope of a term in
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction." The
Amiable Isabella turns on a purported immunity from prize capture by privateers, set
forth in a 1795 treaty between the United States and Spain.156 And Hamdan turns on,
among other things, the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.157
The list of high-authority cases in the network is informative, but it does not
present the stronger or weaker groups of interconnections among the cases. We can,
though, use the same citation data and authority scores to visualize the network in a
map. "Visualization can be an extraordinarily useful tool in the analysis of network
data, allowing one to see instantly [the] important structural features of a network
that would otherwise be difficult to pick out of the raw data."158 Focusing on the
151 See Breardv. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998); Medellinv. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499-500; Medellin
v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661-62 (2005); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006).
151 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court S. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S 522, 524 (1987).
152 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaftv. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 696 (1988).
153 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1989).
154 Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 49-50 (1963).
155 Abbot v. Abbot, 560 U.S. 1, 5 (1983).
156 In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1821) (reporter's preliminary materials,
describing the parties' arguments).
157 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625-35 (2006) (plurality opinion); id. at 641-43 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also Mark A. Drumble, The Expressive Value ofProsecuting and Punishing Terrorists:
Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2007)
(discussing the role of the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and
Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 965-66 (2015) (same).
158 NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 8. The Gephi application enables one to visualize a network using a
variety of mapping algorithms, the choice among which is largely a matter of aesthetic preference: "the
information in [such] graph layouts is contained in the pattern of which nodes are connected to which
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same top twenty cases by authority score, which is about nine percent of the total
network nodes, a force-directed mapping algorithm can depict this sub-network and
group the cases into citation-based clusters.159 That map is in Figure 6.160 Node color
varies with cluster group, and node size varies with authority score.
ChoctawNaionjUS
Air!-ra7nce Saks
TWAj j kint MeeTX Brear eene
Sumitomo Avagliano
Figure 6: Map of the Top 20 Cases, by Authority Score, in the Simple Citation
Network Comprising the Supreme Court's Warsaw Convention Cases and
Related Cases
The complete map groups the cases into six clusters, where the citations among
a cluster's nodes are greater than the citations between it and the other clusters. The
cluster containing Air France, the highest-scoring authority in the network, has no
other Warsaw Convention cases. The other cases in that group are Choctaw Nation,
Societ Nationale, and Schlunck. The cluster containing Zicherman, the next-highest
scoring authority among the Warsaw Convention cases after Air France, also has
three of the other Warsaw Convention cases in the map (Olympic, El Al, and
other nodes.... Ultimately, any arrangement of nodes in space is equally valid as long as no ties are added
or dropped." STEPHEN P. BORGATTI ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL NETWORKS 105 (2013).
159 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (describing the methods).
160 A map of the full citation network, with all 215 nodes and 326 edges, is provided in Appendix A to
this Article.
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Eastern), as well as three of the four consular relations cases (Breard, Dretke, and
Sanchez-Llamas), making it the most populous group. The third-ranked Warsaw
case, TWA, shares a group with Chan (the last Warsaw case on the map) and The
Amiable Isabella. The remaining three clusters in the map contain no Warsaw
Convention cases.161 They are Sumitomo, Stuart, and Maximov; Medellin v. Texas
and Hamdan; and, in a cluster of one, Abbott.
The network map in Figure 6, along with the authority-score data in Table 1,
provides citation-data facts for those seeking to better understand the Supreme
Court's Warsaw Convention jurisprudence, and how that body of law relates to the
Supreme Court's wider treaty-interpretation jurisprudence. No amount of traditional
legal analysis or conceptual reflection would reveal these facts. Consider, for
example, that the Court has thoroughly interwoven its decisions about a treaty
governing private-law claims for losses in international air travel into its treaty cases
involving criminal-law-related consular relations claims, transnational taxation and
trade, transnational litigation processes, and matters of war and peace (including both
Justice Story's decision in The Amiable Isabella, a prize case from the War of 1812,
and the due-process minima for post-9/1 1 military commissions). These data support
the view that there is a vibrant trans-substantive treaty-interpretation jurisprudence
that draws on a long line of decisions, reaching back to the early days of the Republic.
Experts in the treaty-interpretation field can doubtlessly incorporate these newly
revealed facts into further doctrinal analysis.
The edge list that yields the simple citation network can also yield a co-citation
network. The clusters in that semantically denser network can also point to corpora
for keyword analysis. It is to these next-level analyses of the Warsaw Convention
cases that I now turn.
B. Co-Citation Network Clusters & Keyword Analysis of the
Warsaw Convention Cases
A co-citation network measures the strength "of the association between pairs
of frequently-cited documents," thus "provid[ing] a natural and quantitative way to
group or cluster the cited documents."162 The primary input for a co-citation analysis
of the Warsaw Convention cases is, once again, the edge list used to generate the
161 The last of the eight Warsaw Convention cases, Dooley, does not appear in the citation map in Figure
5. Indeed, none of the cases in the cluster containing Dooley appears in Figure 5.
162 Small & Griffith, supra note 63, at 19; see also Tang et al., supra note 45, at 295 (describing co-citation
network analysis as a form of "powerful computational analysis .. . [that] is used to detect the most
frequently referenced topics underlying the literature structure").
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simple citation network.163 Each node in the resulting network represents one of a
pair of co-cited cases, and each edge connecting two nodes varies in weight
according to the number of times the two cases it connects were co-cited in the
subsequent cases in the network. In computing this network, I included all edges with
a weight greater than or equal to two, reflecting case pairs that were co-cited in at
least two subsequent cases.164
The resulting co-citation network has twenty-four nodes connected by seventy-
seven edges, which vary in weight from two to seven. The network map is in Figure
7, below. The community detection algorithm groups the network into four clusters
of cases. Node color varies with cluster group, node size varies with weighted
degree,165 and edge thickness varies with co-citation strength. Edge weights of four
and higher are labeled on the map. Again, traditional legal analysis cannot produce
these data.
163 See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
164 Setting a threshold to focus one's analysis on the more frequently co-cited items is a standard step in
this method. See, e.g., Bommarito et al., supra note 15, at 542 (setting a co-citation strength threshold of
five); Small, supra note 32, at 266, fig.1 (setting a threshold of seven); Small & Griffith, supra note 63,
at 22-28 (comparing results for thresholds of one, three, six, and ten).
165 A node's weighted degree is the sum of the weights of the edges connected to it. See A. Barrat et al.,
The Architecture of Complex Weighted Networks, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 3747, 3748 (2004)
(referring to this sum as "vertex strength"). In an undirected network such as a co-citation network-that
is, a network where the edges have no inward or outward directionality, but simply connect paired items-
weighted degree is an appropriate centrality measure. See NEWMAN, supra note 105, at 69-70, 114-16
(explaining this contrast between citation and co-citation etworks). The Kleinberg "hubs and authorities"
measure, by contrast, depends on the difference between inward and outward directionality, and thus has
no application to a co-citation network. Id. at 178-8 1.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.660
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 36 | VOL. 81 | 2019
'U
Sumiton¶~(~kzflrn
Figure 7: Co-Citation Network Map of the Supreme Court's Warsaw
Convention Cases and Related Cases
The twenty-four cases in the co-citation network are the twenty top-authority-
score cases from the simple network, listed in Table 1, along with four more cases
from the total network. Though none of these four additional cases are among the
top twenty of the simple network by authority score, all are in the top thirty-five.
The four additional cases are Boumedienne v. Bush,1 66 a post-Hamdan case about the
availability of habeas review for enemy combatants that the United States has
imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay; and three cases involving fatal maritime
166 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).




accidents-Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,16 7 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire,1 6 8 and Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.1 6 9
Boumedienne, like all the twenty top-authority-score cases in Table 1, turns in
part on the meaning of a treaty-namely, the 1934 Treaty Defining Relations with
Cuba.170 The three maritime-accident cases do not involve a treaty. They do,
however, raise questions about he scope of the Death on the High Seas Act
("DOHSA"), 171 a statute that plays a role in both the Dooley and Zicherman Warsaw
Convention cases.1 72
In the co-citation network, the cluster of the three DOHSA cases (which is in
the upper right-hand corner of Figure 6) does not connect to the remaining three
clusters. Those three clusters of treaty cases, by contrast, thoroughly interconnect
with one another. Each cluster has a dominant node, and they are three of the top
four co-citation nodes by weighted degree: Air France, with a weighted degree of
sixty-two, at the core of a thirteen-node cluster; Olympic, with a weighted degree of
thirty-one, at the core of a five-node cluster; and Societe Nationale, also with a
weighted degree of thirty-one, at the core of a three-node cluster. The nodes in the
three interconnected clusters, as well as in the isolated cluster, are listed in Table 2,
below. The Olympic cluster has three of the seven Warsaw Convention cases in this
network (Olympic, Zicherman, and El Al) and two of the four Consular Relations
cases (Breard and Dretke). The Societe Nationale cluster has none of the Warsaw
cases, but both of the litigation-procedure-treaty cases (along with The Amiable
Isabella prize case). The Air France cluster, the largest of the three treaty-case
clusters, has the balance of both the Warsaw cases (Air France, TWA, Eastern, and
Chan) and the Consular Relations cases (Medellin and Sanchez-Llamas), as well as
the tax treaty cases (Stuart and Maximov), the Guantanamo cases (Hamdan and
167 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
161 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
169 Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
1o See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753-55 (discussing the treaty).
1'i 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-08 (2018); see Mobil Oil, 436 U.S. at 620-25 (discussing DOHSA); Offshore
Logistics, 477 U.S. at 214-33 (same); Miles, 498 U.S. at 24-33 (same).
172 See Dooley v. Kor. Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 118 (1998); Zicherman v. Kor. Air Lines Co., 516
U.S. 217, 229-32 (1996). Dooley is absent from the co-citation network, just as it was absent from the top
twenty highest authority-score cases in the simple network. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Boumedienne), the child abduction case (Abbott), and the other two top-authority-
score cases, Sumitomo and Choctaw Nation.
The Air France node has both the highest weighted degree in the largest group
and the highest weighted egree over all. It is also in both of the network's strongest
co-citation pairings, having been co-cited seven times each with Sumitomo and
Choctaw Nation. Air France is also in two of the four pairings with an edge weight
of five, having been co-cited that often with both TWA and Eastern. Sumitomo has
the other two five-weight pairings, with TWA and Zicherman. Finally, Air France
has a third of the twelve four-weight pairingsl73 and a third of the eighteen three-
weight pairings.' It is thus the most central Warsaw Convention case in both the
citation and co-citation networks, which situate the Warsaw Convention cases in the
landscape of United States treaty law more generally (Olympic, Zicherman, and
TWA, the next three Warsaw Convention cases after Air France in the co-citation
network, by weighted degree, are also the next three Warsaw cases afterAir France
in the citation network, by authority score).
The Supreme Court has cited Air France for key treaty interpretation principles
seventeen times, from 1988 to 2017. Five of the cases are Warsaw Convention cases,
and twelve are not. How has Air France come to play such a prominent role in the
Supreme Court's treaty cases, from the perspective of traditional legal doctrine?
With the analysis inAir France itself as a backdrop, we can use the citation data that
put Air France in the spotlight as a map for understanding the concept(s) for which
the Air France sign has become a symbol. As I read these cases, and explain in a
moment, the primary concept appears to be "start with treaty text," and the secondary
concept appears to be "consider treaty context." These are quite handy trans-treaty
principles.
Case Co-citation Cluster Weighted Degree
Air Franice \. Saiks7 1 62
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano 1 49
Chloctaw Nationl of'I ldis N. LUn1ited states _____i2
TWA, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.* 1 24
Medcllin \. Texas I___ I 1
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd* 1 13
Un 1ited Statesv\. Stuar t __ _11
Abbottv. Abbott 1 8
IHaindani \. Rumnsfeld 1I
Maximov v. United States 1 7
Chianv . KoreanAir Lines, Ltd.:` 1I
173 These are with Medellin, Olympic, Societe Nationale, and Zicherman.
1' These are withAbbott, Breard, Chan, ElAl, Schlunk, and Stuart.
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Co-citation Cluster Weighted Degree
1 A
ilies v. Apex ivianne korp. I 4
Table 2: Cases, by Cluster and Weighted-Degree Score, in the Co-Citation Network
Comprising the Supreme Court's Warsaw Convention Cases and Related Cases
(asterisk notes a Warsaw Convention case)
In Air France, a unanimous decision,"' the tort plaintiff-Valerie Saks-had
suffered "severe pressure and pain in her left ear"17 6 as her Air France flight from
Paris made its descent o Los Angeles. A doctor determined, a few days later, "that
she had become permanently deaf in her left ear.""' According to all the evidence
in the case, however, "the aircraft's pressurization system had operated in the usual
manner."" Saks' right to recover thus turned on whether the operative language in
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention-"the accident which caused the damage"-
was limited to unintended, unexpected occurrences that cause injury (in which event
she could not recover), or more broadly covered any hazard of international air travel
(in which case she could recover).179 To decide the question, Justice O'Connor
framed the inquiry as follows:
175 In other words, the most central Warsaw Convention case from a network-analysis point of view is,
from the perspective of the attitudinal model, an empty space. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying
text.
176 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 394 (1985).
177Id.
171 Id. at 395.
179 Id. at 395-96. The Court likened this treaty-scope question to "American jurisprudence [which] has
long recognized this distinction between an accident that is the cause of an injury and an injury that is
itself an accident." Id. at 399. In an insurance coverage case five decades before Air France, Justice
Cardozo warned-in dissent-that "[t]he attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental
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"[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreement, and to ascertain
their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty,
the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties." Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943). The analysis
must begin, however, with the text of the treaty and the context in which the
written words are used. See Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53-54
(1963).1s
In other words, organize interpretive resources as follows: first disputed text and
surrounding text, then wider context (including backdrop, negotiations, and course
of performance). The Court also described this wider context as "the shared
expectations of the contracting parties."8
The disputed text and surrounding text was insufficient, in Air France, to
resolve the scope of the term "accident" in Article 17: "While the text of the
Convention gives ... two clues to the meaning of 'accident,' it does not define the
term. Nor is the context in which the term is used illuminating." 18 2 As a result, Justice
O'Connor proceeded through the additional contextual materials, considering both
its meaning in French legal materials (the Convention's original drafting
language)18 3 and the clues to be gleaned from "the negotiating history of the
Convention, the conduct of the parties to the Convention, and the weight of precedent
in foreign and American courts.""' Only after detailed discussion of all these
materials did the Court conclude that an "accident," in Article 17 terms, "arises only
if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that
is external to the passenger,"1 5 blocking Saks' Warsaw Convention claim.
means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog." Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Quagmire-curious or not, the distinction decided Saks'
claim.
'
8 Air France, 470 U.S. at 396-97.
1" Id. at 399.
182 Id.
13 Id. at 399-400 (discussing these materials).
184 Id. at 400; see also id. at 400-05 (discussing all these sources in turn).
15 Id. at 405.




The catholic contours ofAir France, as a sequence of wide-ranging interpretive
steps for resolving a case about treaty scope, give it universal appeal.186 An opinion
cast in textualist terms can quote Air France's "must begin ... with the text"
directive."' An opinion cast in a purposive, contextualist vein can quote either the
case's history-negotiations-practical construction trio or the "shared expectations of
the contracting parties" guidance.' There is a preferred half to which each of these
two main methodological camps can point. Indeed, Air France has twice appeared
in both the majority and dissenting opinions in a given case, straddling just this
difference between textualism and contextualism. In United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, the majority says, "[i]n construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we
first look to its terms to determine its meaning. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,
397 (1985)"; whereas the dissent says, "[i]n construing a treaty, the Court has the
'responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the
shared expectations of the contracting parties.' Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399
(1985)."189 Similarly, in Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, the
majority says, "[o]ur interpretation must begin, as always, with the text of the
Conventions. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)"; whereas the dissent
says, of other treaty members, "[t]heir consistent practice is persuasive evidence of
the Conventions' meaning. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985),
quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)."19 It is not
difficult to understand Air France's longstanding popularity with the justices, when
we follow the pointers that network analysis provides for us.
What, then, of the broader semantic content of these co-citation clusters? In
prior co-co-citation studies, the resulting clusters of strongly co-cited items embody
groups of concepts that one can differentiate semantically. TheAir France "start with
186 See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends ofthe Court, 102 VA. L. REv. 289, 295
n.24 (2016) (citing Air France for the proposition that,"[w]hen interpreting treaties, the Court begins with
the treaty text, but explicitly gives weight to the views of both the United States and foreign sovereigns
that are party to the treaty") (emphasis added).
117 See Medellinv. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-07 (2008); E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-35
(1991); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court S. Dist. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534
(1987).
188 See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 12 (2014); see also e.g., BG Group PLC v. Argentina,
572 U.S. 25, 37 (2014); Abbottv. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010); New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767,
831 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Zichermanv. Kor. Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 223 (1996); Chanv.
Kor. Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring).
189 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663, 675 n.14 (1992).
'90 Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 65, 84 (1993).
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treaty text" concept is one element. But, using corpora comprising the texts of cases
in the four clusters of the Warsaw Convention co-citation network, we can
characterize the clusters' respective semantic profiles in more granular detail.
Consider, first, the two clusters that contain no Warsaw Convention cases. The
larger of the two (by weighted degree) contains Societe Nationale and Schlunk, two
cases about litigation-procedure treaties, as well as The Amiable Isabella. The other
cluster contains Mobil Oil and the other two fatal-maritime-accident cases. If we
create a corpus comprising all of each cluster's constituent cases, we can generate a
list of the keywords that most strongly distinguish the cluster from a corpus of
general English-language usage.1 91 The top twenty multi-word keywordsl9 2 for these
two clusters, listed in descending keyness-score order, are in Table 3.
The Soci& Nationale Cluster The Mobil Oil Cluster
inlterl law wo N\ gfu-1tl deathi
contracting state maritime law
ev idence conto n gener -cial 11mitime law
due process death action
obtainingw ev iden~ce stt wron1gful deathl
comity analysis wrongful death action
judicial assistanice savin 11'Clause
proprietary interest state law
negotiating history marmitimne wr10ngful deathl
17th article pecuniary loss
first resort jurisdictional sav ing
requesting state jurisdictional saving clause
pretial discovery dealth stattet
foreign state wrongful death statute
amercicanl court common101 law\
civil law maritime wrongful death action
taking c idence delth renmed\
preliminary draft general maritime wrongful death
conitracting' party state wrong1 Ful-dcalth
foreign discovery federal maritime law
Table 3: Top 20 Keywords for the Co-Citation Network Clusters Anchored by Socidtd
Nationale and Mobile Oil
From the Societe Nationale corpus, some of the keywords might just as readily
appear in disputes involving other treaties-phrases such as "contracting state,"
191 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
192 Note that, in extracting keywords, SketchEngine is set to ignore letter capitalization Also, the keyword
results are in lemma form, so, for example, "savings clause" becomes "saving clause."
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"comity analysis," "negotiating history," and "foreign state." Other keywords from
the corpus, however, point squarely at the litigation-procedure treaties at issue in the
cases-"evidence convention," "due process," "obtaining evidence," "pretrial
discovery," "taking evidence," and "foreign discovery." The phrase "17th article" is
a quirk of The Amiable Isabella case, the core disputed provision of which was the
"17th article" of a treaty between the United States and Spain.1 93 With respect to the
Mobil Oil corpus, it is difficult to imagine a list of keywords more befitting a trio of
cases about fatal maritime accidents. Eleven of the twenty keyword phrases contain
the word "death," and six of the twenty contain the word "maritime." Three, each a
variation of the others, contain both: "maritime wrongful death," "maritime wrongful
death action," and "general maritime wrongful death."
Consider, next, the two clusters that do contain Warsaw Convention cases. Both
also contain the Consular Relations cases in the co-citation network. And the Air
France cluster, in contrast to the Olympic cluster, contains much else besides. I
prepared two different corpora for the Air France cluster. One contains the texts of
all thirteen cases, and the other contains the seven cases having an edge weight equal
to or greater than the lowest edge weight in the Olympic cluster (twelve)-thus
providing a common threshold minimum.19 4 The top twenty keywords from each of
these three corpora are in Table 4. The obvious difference between the full and partial
Air France clusters is that, with the inclusion of Hamdan and Boumedienne, we see
"military commission" (as the most distinguishing keyword), "ex parte," a common
case-name portion that appears repeatedly in the Guantanamo cases,19 5 "enemy
193 See In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68-69 (1821) ("The point to which the Court
will first direct its attention, is the last made, viz. whether the 17th article of the Treaty of 1795, so far as
it respects passports, is inoperative and imperfect in consequence of the omission to annex the form of the
passport to the treaty."). This matter of the passport form, whichwas never annexedto the treaty, propelled
the case into the jurisprudence of prize and privateers:
it is the opinion of the Court ... that the form of the passport not having been
annexed to the 17th article of the treaty, the immunity, whatever it was,
intended by that article, never took effect, and therefore, in examining and
deciding the case before us, we must be governed by the general law of prize.
Id. at 76.
194 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. At this minimum edge weight, the Societe Nationale corpus
would be unchanged. The Mobil Oil corpus, however, would be empty; the highest edge weight score in
that cluster is eight (for the Mobil Oil case).
195 Of the forty-one occurrences of the "ex parte" in the full Air France corpus, only one is not in a case
name. Of the remaining forty, twenty-three are in citations to McCardle, Milligan, Quirin, and Yerger-
all of central importance in the Guantanamo cases. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400
(1926); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte
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combatant," and "martial law." None of these is a keyword in the smallerAir France
corpus, or in the Olympic corpus. The lists do have some overlapping terms. The
term "domestic law" is in all three lists in Table 4. The keyword "procedural default"
is common to the Olympic and full Air France corpora. Both "bodily injury" and
"international air" are common to the Olympic and shorter Air France corpora.
Perhaps the largest difference between the Air France and Olympic clusters, reflected
in the contrast between the Olympic and the shorter Air France corpora, is the tilt in
the Air France cluster toward matters of money and finance. Of the twenty keywords
for the smaller Air France cluster, eight of them are of this type: liability limit,
liability limitation, French franc, official price, tax investigation, Canadian tax, 07-
per-pound liability, and 07-per-pound liability limit.1 96 The Olympic cluster,
featuring both "bodily injury" and "personal injury" keywords, has no counterparts
for these Air France monetary keywords; nor, for
Nationale or Mobil Oil clusters.
that matter, do the Societe
Air France Cluster - Air France Cluster - Top 7 Olympic Cluster
All
iihtary comn11ission1 liability hlmit locallkm
procedural default* 16sion corporelle state court
liability limit comnestic law,* domestic law**
domestic law** treaty prov isions procelural clcfilt*
passenger ticket liabili limitation bodily injurs
Icsion corporelle federal lawN wilful inisconluct
Cx parte relIch franc international air
liability limitation bodily injurit air carrier
cominoln law domestic effect treaty interpretations
full effect treaty blagtage federal court
cliny combatant criminal prosccution flight attendant
travel restriction official price personal illitry
treaty prov ision state In\ carrier liabilit\
international law 07-per-potti liability drafting listory
iartial lawm 0-per-pounl liability limit unusual cent
due process non-self-executing treaty uniform treaty interpretation
federal lma psychic ineition air carie iabit
Ireturn remedy Itax investigation Iuniform treaty _I
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). In the shorter Air France corpus, the phrase "ex parte" appears ix
times, in six case citations (including one to Milligan).
196 These last two are truncated forms of reference to language, from the Trans WorldAirlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp. case, about a liability cap in a formula for calculating the value of lost property. See Trans
WorldAirlines, 466 U.S. at 245 ("We conclude that ... a $9.07-per-pound liability limit is not inconsistent
with the Convention") (emphasis added).
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Table 4: Top 20 Keywords for the Co-Citation Network Clusters Anchored by Air
France (both full and partial) and by Olympic Airways. Terms that appear in two lists
are marked with an asterisk or similar indicator.
These semantic profiles of the co-citation network's case clusters show that the
clusters occupy different conceptual regions, within the Warsaw Convention cases
and the surrounding treaty cases in which judicial citations enmesh them. And the
semantic profiles, like the clusters themselves, emerge from the citation network that
undergirds and animates them. As lawyers seek fully to understand the Supreme
Court's Warsaw Convention jurisprudence, and what it may portend in future air-
travel or other treaty domains, these facts are new data-driven, bottom-up inputs.
One thing lacking from the Warsaw Convention network is a sense of dynamic
change over time, a view of how citation clusters have changed as new cases cite old
and new pairs of cases that reinforce existing linkages or forge new ones. To see
some dynamism, we require a network large enough, spanning a sufficient number
of years, to afford time-wise snapshots for comparison. The network of intellectual
property cases decided over 70+ years, with an edge list more than five times larger
than that of the Warsaw Convention network, enables just such comparisons over
time.
C. Co-Citation Network Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Intellectual Property Cases, 1947-2018
The second core network I examine is the one comprising all the citations to
earlier Supreme Court cases one finds in all the Supreme Court's intellectual
property decisions from 1947 to June 2018, the end of the Supreme Court's October
2017 Tenn. The network has 1,648 nodes and 2,940 edges; node in-degree ranges
from zero to twenty, and node out-degree ranges from zero to fifty-seven. Of the
1,648 nodes, 183 have an out-degree of one or more, i.e., are citing cases. Patent
cases dominate the network, comprising 117 of the 183 (63.9%); copyright cases
account for 35 (19.1%) and trademark matters cases for 31 (16.9%).197 A graph
197 The data file for this edge list includes, for each citing case, a tag for the intellectual property area in
which I categorized it. See supra note 110. When making these category tallies, I assigned to the patent
group both the one design patent case (Samsung Electrs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016)) and the
one trade secret case (Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)) in the lot. I assigned the
Zacchini case to the trademark group. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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depicting the rolling four-year average of each type of case, from 1950 to 2018, is
provided in Appendix B.
The community detection algorithm groups the simple citation network of all
the cases into twenty-one clusters. Only nine of these clusters have more than 5%
(83) of the nodes, and the top five clusters account for almost 46% (751) of the nodes.
The top forty-one cases in the network by authority score, for example, can be
mapped using a force-directed algorithm. In the resulting map, in Figure 8,198 all but
six of the nodes are from the same cluster, which is the largest single cluster in the
overall map.
We can also parse the seventy-two-year span into two versions, to assess how
the central cases' authority scores have changed over time. Using 1982 as the half-
way mark from 1947 to 2018,199 we can put the authority scores of top cases in 2018
alongside the top authority scores as they stood in 1982. In other words, we take two
snapshots of the top authority scores as the network grows from 1947 onward, one
after thirty-six years have elapsed and another after seventy-two years have elapsed.
Table 5, below, presents these two snapshots. A few things stand out. First, the two
lists are remarkably similar, notwithstanding the additional thirty-six years of case-
law development that took place from 1983 to 2018. Of the top twenty in 2018,
eighteen were also in the top twenty at the end of 1982, though some were in different
ordinal positions. The two cases that joined the top twenty, as of 2018, are United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,200 and Kendall v. Winsor;20 1 the two cases they
displaced from the top twenty of 1982 are B.B. Chemical Co. v. ElliS20 2 and United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States.20 3 It would be a mistake, I think, to attribute
this high degree of stability in the top authority scores to the idea that older cases,
simply by virtue of having been around longer, have garnered and continue to garner
more and more inward citations (thus driving up their authority scores). If that were
true, the correlation between a case's year of decision and its authority score would
be large and negative, as higher authority scores pair to smaller calendar-year
198 A map of the full citation network is provided in Appendix C to this Article.
199 In the original project that used the first iteration of this dataset, I chose 1947 as the start year precisely
so that 1982, the year that the national intermediate appellate court for all patent cases went into operation,
would be the midpoint of the covered time span. See Miller, supra note 11, at 389. A different start year
would yield different networks.
200 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
201 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (1 Howe.) 322 (1859).
202 B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
203 U.S. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), superseded by statute, Patent Misuse Reform
Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
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numbers. But that is not true. The Pearson r between decisional year and authority
score among the top 100 cases in the 1947-2018 network is 0.065, i.e., small and
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Figure 8: Map of the Top 41 Cases, by Authority Score, in the Simple Citation
Network Generated from the Supreme Court's Intellectual Property Cases from
1947 to June 2018
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Table 5: Top 20 Cases, by Authority Score, in the Simple Citation Networks Derived
from the Supreme Court's Intellectual Property Cases, from 1947 to 2018 (left) and from
1947 to 1982 (right)
Third, and perhaps most surprising given that the family of citing cases is
pegged squarely to intellectual property law, is the dominance of antitrust cases
among the top authorities in this simple citation network. Of the top twenty in 2018,
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fully half-including four of the top ten-began as antitrust enforcement actions:
Ethyl Gasoline, International Salt, Masonite Corp., Hartford-Empire Co., Univis
Lens, National Lead, Paramount Pictures, Socony-Vaccum Oil, International
Business Machines, and U.S. Gypsum.204 That there are deep and important
connections between intellectual property law (patent law especially) and antitrust
law has long been appreciated, of course.205 But this degree of centrality for antitrust
cases within 70+ years of the Supreme Court's intellectual property cases took me
by surprise, and I teach both intellectual property law and antitrust law.
What, then, of the co-citation network? How did it change, from 1982 to 2018?
In what fashion, if at all, does it show the stability of the authority scores in the
simple citation network? What else does it teach us about the fabric of the Supreme
Court's current intellectual property jurisprudence?
I determined the co-citation networks from the edge lists for the 1947-1982
and 1947-2018 periods, including all edges with a weight greater than or equal to
two.206 The 1947-1982 network has 201 nodes and 1,329 edges. Edge weights
ranging from two to ten. The top three nodes by weighted degree-Mercoid (261),
Ethyl Gasoline (212), and International Salt (197)-are the same nodes, in the same
order, as the top three authority scores in the corresponding citation etwork. The
community detection algorithm groups the network into eleven clusters of cases.
Ordering these clusters by the edge weights of their most central modes, the top five
clusters account for 85% of the nodes. The 1947-2018 network has 400 nodes and
2,184 edges, with edge weights ranging from two to eleven. The top three nodes by
weighted degree have not changed, though their weights have grown from continued
citations-Mercoid (279), Ethyl Gasoline (224), and International Salt (214) (in the
corresponding citation etwork, they rank first, third, and fourth by authority score).
The community detection algorithm groups the network into thirty-one clusters of
cases. Ordering the clusters by central-node edge weight, the top five clusters
account for sixty-three percent of the nodes.
Putting the top five clusters of each of these co-citation networks side by side
helps one discern how the doctrinal fabric has shifted from 1982 to 2018. Table 6,
204 The net change in number of antitrust cases from the 1982 top twenty is zero: Paramount Pictures
(antitrust) and Kendall (patent) replaced B.B. Chemical (patent) and United Shoe Machinery (antitrust).
205 See generally CHRISTINA BOHANNON & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (2012); WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND
ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973); HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (3d
ed. 2017); Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Ships Sail an Antitrust Sea, 30 SEATTLE UL. REV. 395 (2007).
206 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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below, puts the top five clusters from the two co-citation networks in an illuminating
juxtaposition; it shows the top ten nodes, by edge weight, in each of the top five
clusters. Two of the five clusters-the first and the fifth-show notable continuity,
even as the individual nodes' edge-weights grew from additional citations over time.
For example, in the first cluster, anchored by Mercoid v. Mid-Continent, nine of the
cases are in both the 1947-1982 cluster and the 1947-2018 cluster, though ordinal
positions changed. Leitch Mfg. dropped out and A.B. Dick stepped in, which I have
highlighted in grey. Similarly, in the fifth cluster, one finds seven of the ten cases in
both the earlier and later clusters. I have highlighted in grey the three that dropped
out from 1982, and two of the three that stepped in by 2018; the third addition by
2018, the GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea case (highlighted in purple), jumped from the
third to the fifth cluster. There are also intriguing discontinuities. The third-ranked
cluster from 1982 splits basically in two, sending three nodes to the second-ranked
2018 cluster (Sola, Katzinger, and MacGregor, highlighted in blue) and three nodes
to the third-ranked 2018 cluster (Stiffel, Compco, and Graham, highlighted in
yellow). The fourth-ranked cluster from 1982 simply slips out of sight, below the top
five. In 2018, the fourth-ranked cluster is dominated by copyright law, for eight of
ten cases.
The interplay of patent law and antitrust law remains prominent. In the second-
ranked cluster, in both networks, antitrust enforcement cases dominate the group. In
the 1947-1982 network, they are nine of the ten cases; Bement did not begin as an
antitrust case (though the only federal question in the case was, in fact, about the
validity of a contract term under the Sherman Act). In the 1947-2018 network, they
are seven of the ten. Turning to the top-ranked cluster, in both eras, there are three
antitrust enforcement cases (Univis Lens, IBM, and United Shoe). In addition, in both
eras, all seven of the remaining cases in the top cluster played important roles in the
doctrine of patent misuse,20 7 an affirmative defense to patent infringement that
sounds in antitrust.208 Four of the five clusters in 2018, then, have a substantive
doctrinal focus that is readily apparent to a person familiar with the Supreme Court's
intellectual property and antitrust cases: patent and antitrust (clusters 1 and 2),
copyright (cluster 4), and patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act
(cluster 5).209 That leaves cluster 3, an intriguing core of preemption cases (Sears,
207 See 6 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 18:1-18:16 (4th ed. 2017) (discussing the origins and history
of misuse).
208 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 372-73 (2003) (discussing the doctrine).
209 See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 453-537 (5th ed. 2016) (discussing this facet of
patent jurisprudence).
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Compco, Bonito Boats, and Kewanee) and patent validity cases (Graham, Pennock,
Grant, Pfaff and Seymour). What more is it?
1947 to 1982 Co-citation Network 1947 to 2018 Co-citation Network
Weight Case Case Weight
261 Mercoid v. Mid-Continent (1944) Mercoid v. Mid-Continent 279
(1944)
178 Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger (1942) Motion Picture Pats. v. 206
Universal Film (1917)
150 Carbice Corp. v. American Pats. Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger 204
(1931) (1942)
117 United States v. Univis Lens (1942) Carbice Corp. v. American 174
Pats. (1931)
108 Motion Picture Pats. v. Universal United States v. Univis Lens 149
Film (1917) (1942)
95 Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell IBM v. United States (1936) 95
(1944)
83 IBM v. United States (1936) Mercoid v. Minneapolis- 95
Honeywell (1944)
75 B.B. Chemical v. Ellis (1942) Hei \. AB. Dicl Co.. 79
(19 12)
66 United Shoe Mach. v. United States B.B. Chemical v. Ellis (1942) 75
(1926)
41 Leili \11- \. Haiter (1938 United Shoe Mach. v. United 69
States (1926)
212 Ethyl Gasoline v. United States (1940) Ethyl Gasoline v. United 224
States (1940)
197 International Salt v. United States International Salt v. United 214
(1947) States (1947)
153 United States v. Masonite (1942) Sol Elec. \. Jeferson Elec. 179
(1942)
151 United States v. National Lead (1947) Unted States v. Masointe 171
(1942)
147 Hartford-Empire v. United States iEdwind Kit/ine \. iichiago 160
(1945) Melulli I(194-)
131 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil United States v. National 151
(1940) Lead (1947)
98 United States v. U.S. Gypsum (1948) Hartford-Empire v. United 147
States (1945)
83 United States v. General Elec. (1926) United States v. Socony- 131
Vacuum Oil (1940)
81 (rintd Sta2-8405 Pamlnt Picture United States v. General Elec. 109
(1948) (1926)
76 Bement v. National Harrow Co. MaCG1'Cgor \.. WeCstinghouLSe 107
(1902) Elec. (194-)
179 SolaiElcc, \. Jcffercson Elec. (1942) Grahainv1 . John11 Deere Co. 159
(1966)
150 Edwar Id Kadngervcl . Chlicago Mctfflic Sears, Roebutck \. Stiffe-l 106
(194-) i (1964)
107 M "CGregorvN. Wecstinghouse Elec., Bonito Boats v. Thunder 99
(1947) Craft Boats (1989)
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| 1947 to 1982 Co-citation Network 1947 to 2018 Co-citation Network
Case Case
Compco \. Day-Brite (%194)
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp.
(1974)
Pennockv. Dialogue (1829)
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins (1969)
Grantv. Raymond (1832)
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. (1998)
Weight 1
95 Scott Paper v
78 Grea Aidl &
I 9 50)
72 1K n1al1 \




-- 56 1 Cuno bEi u >
Iox 1ilm v. D~oyal (1912)
Twentieth Century Music v.
Aiken (1975)
Mazer v. Stein (1954)






Wheaton v. Peters (1834)
Harper & Row Publ'rs v.






















44 Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant O'Reilly v. Morse (1853) 94
(1948)
44 O'Reilly v. Morse (1853) Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo 92
Inoculant (1948)
36 Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) 86
35 11acka Radio \. Radio Corp. ( 1939) ParkervFi look (197S) 70
34 Deepsouth Packing v. Laitram Corp. Cochrane v. Deener (1877) 70
(1972)
32 Cochrane v. Deener (1877) DeepsouthPacking v. 67
Laitram Corp. (1972)
32 Rubber-Tip Penwil . IHowarud (I N74) United States v. Dubilier 61
Condenser (1933)
32 Tilghumi . Proctor t I8 1) Diamod \. Chakrabrt 59
(19080)
Table 6: Top 5 Clusters, by Anchor Node's Edge-Weight, in the 1947-1982 and 1947-
2018 Co-Citation Networks
Before delving further into the substantive content of cluster 3 in the 2018
network, it is helpful to map both the 1947-1982 and 1947-2018 co-citation patterns.














Figures 9 and 10, which-like Table 6, comprise the top 5 clusters-are the force-
directed maps of the co-citation networks.2 1 0 Node size varies with weighted degree,
edge thickness varies with edge weight, and the color palette is the same for both
maps (in descending order of cluster node-count, from blue to grey).
210 Larger, higher-resolution versions of these images are available at this Journal's website. Prior to
January 1, 2020, please use the following URL: https://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/lawreview.
After January 1, 2020, please use the following URL: https://lawreview.pitt.edu.
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Figure 9: Top 5 Clusters, by Anchor Node's Edge-Weight, in the 1947-
1982 Co-Citation Network


















Figure 10: Top 5 Clusters, by Anchor Node's Edge-Weight, in the 1947-2018 Co-
Citation Network
In the 1947 to 1982 map, the first three clusters-and especially the Mercoid
and Ethyl Gas patent and antitrust clusters-dominate the map. In the 1947 to 2018
map, the Mercoid and Ethyl Gas clusters are still present and significant. The Sola
cluster of the earlier map, however, has disappeared (its top three nodes having been
absorbed into the Ethyl Gas cluster). The patentable-subject-matter cluster, in the
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lower-right corner of both maps, has become thicker in the 2018 map; the Supreme
Court, which has decided four cases in this area since 20 10,211 continues to rely on
the same core group of precedents to explain their current approach to questions
about patentable subject matter.
The two new clusters to emerge in the 1947 to 2018 map-one pink, anchored
by Paramount and one green, anchored by Graham-focus on copyright and a mix,
respectively. Paramount, an antitrust enforcement action involving copyright rights
in motion pictures, connects the copyright cluster back to the patent and antitrust
clusters (with edge-weight-five links to Ethyl Gas, International Salt, and Motion
Picture Patents, and edge-weight-four links to Carbice, Hartford-Empire, and
Mercoid v. Mid-Continent). The mix cluster's strongest link to another cluster is
Graham 's link to GreatA&P Tea, with an edge weight of eight-echoing the pair's
common membership in the 1982 map's now-dissolved Sola cluster. Both Graham
and Great A &P Tea focus on patent law's non-obviousness requirement,212 So this
high co-citation count is not terribly surprising. Can we glean anything further about
the doctrinal substance of the mixed cluster's congeries of preemption, patent-
validity, and other cases using keyword analysis?
211 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
212 See MUELLER, supra note 209, at 358-61 (discussing the cases).


























The Graham cluster has forty-five member nodes. The nodes range in weighted
degree from 159 (for Graham) to 2, with a median value of 12. Including all twenty-
two cases with edge weights above the median,213 the resulting corpus can be used
for keyword analysis.21 4 The table at left lists the top twenty-two keywords for this
corpus, in descending keyness-score order.
Some of the keywords are a by-product of the detailed fact-settings of particular
cases, such as the "shredded wheat" of Kellogg215 and the "hinge plate" of
213 The additional twelve cases, beyond the ten already identified in Table 6, are-in descending order by
weighted degree-as follows: Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973),
superseded by statute Copyright Act of 1978, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2016); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379
U.S. 29 (1964); J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982); Singer Mfg. v. June Mfg., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); N.Y.
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
214 See supra notes 74-94, 112-15 and accompanying text.
215 The phrase appears thirty-nine times, excluding use in case names, in Kellogg.
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Graham.216 Others, however, suggest a Court repeatedly grappling with the proper
relationships among state trade secret law, state unfair competition law, and federal
patent law. The phrases "exclusive right" and "public domain," the Castor and Pollux
of intellectual property law (or is it Romulus and Remus?), indicate the Court's
concern not only with the federalism questions animating preemption, but the with
the equally weighty policy questions of polyarchy and propertization217 that sit at the
very heart of intellectual property law.218 Given that the 1947 to 2018 network is but
a snapshot, and thus a co-citation network derived from an even larger cohort of
Supreme Court intellectual property cases might reveal additional important clusters
and connections, it is important to remain tentative in one's assessment. All the same,
as the Court continues to hear intellectual property cases at an increased pace (see
Appendix B), this topical cluster, touching on intellectual property's broader
systemic themes, bears watching.
V. CONCLUSION
Where there are citations, there are signs. Where there are recurring citations,
there are symbols. The semantic self-portrait that decisional law paints in the co-
citation networks and keyword lists that we can derive takes human judgment both
to generate and to interpret. The techniques and results reported here are, not, in other
words, a flight from interpretive judgment-at least, not as I understand them.2 19
Rather, they are an aid to, a further input for, interpretive judgment. Professor
Howard White's observation about the hunch that animates exploration of author-
level co-citation networks is equally applicable to the case-level co-citation analysis
conducted here: "since most authors are never co-cited, recurrent co-citation is a
signal that something interpretable is happening."220 It is that something
interpretable among both the Supreme Court's Warsaw Convention cases and its
216 The phrase appears twenty-nine times in Graham.
217 
See generally Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV.
123, 126 (2006) (exploring, for intellectual property law, the upshot of the fact "that government's
decisions with respect to property assignments can steer decision architectures toward a polyarchical or
hierarchical architecture").
218 The 2003 issue of Law & Contemporary Problems devoted to papers on "The Public Domain" remains
a critically valuable guide to the subject. See Journal ofLaw and Contemporary Problems, DUKE SCHOOL
OF LAW, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol66/issl/ ( ast visited Apr. 6, 2019).
219 Cf Stanley Fish, The Interpretive Poverty of Data, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 2, 2018), https://
balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-interpretive-poverty-of-data.html ("The desire to generate human
meaning by eliminating from the patterns that convey it all traces of the human is at once perennial and
doomed to be ever un-fulfilled.").
220 Howard D. White, Citation Analysis and Disclosure Analysis Revisited, 25 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 89,
93 (2004).
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intellectual property cases (of the last 70+ years) that I have sought to uncover. To
the degree I have succeeded, I have shown at least some of the ways that co-citation
and keyword analyses can deepen our understanding of any patch of the semantic
fabric of our decisional law. Further insights await further work using network-
analysis-driven methods.
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APPENDIX A
This figure is the force-directed map of the full network that embraces the
Warsaw Convention cases. It has 215 nodes, 326 edges, and 9 clusters (grouped by
Gephi's community detection algorithm, with its "modularity" parameter set to 1.0).






















The graph below shows the rolling four-year average of the number of patent,
copyright, and trademark decisions from the Supreme Court, from 1950 to 2018. The
graph begins in 1950 with the average of cases from 1947 to 1950, inclusive. In all
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APPENDIX C
This figure is the force-directed map of the full network of Supreme Court cases
cited in the Supreme Court's intellectual property decisions from 1947 to June 2018.
It has 1,648 nodes and 2,940 edges in 21 clusters (grouped by Gephi's community
detection algorithm, with its "modularity" parameter set to 1.0). Node size varies by
authority score. A larger, higher-resolution version of this image is available at this
Journal's website. Prior to January 1, 2020, please use the following URL:
https://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/lawreview. After January 1, 2020,
please use the following URL: https://lawreview.pitt.edu.
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